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I study financial intermediation and optimal regulation through the lens of banking
theory and applied corporate finance. In my understanding, the theory on banking is
primarily the theory on bank runs. And the key questions I have been pursuing to answer
are the causes of runs in both the traditional and shadow banking sectors and the roles of
the market and the regulator in maintaining financial stability.
I start with the shadow banking system outside the traditional regulatory framework,
which accumulated tremendous risks and led to a major financial crisis. Why don’t we
simply shut down the shadow banking sector? Chapter 1 examines the role of shadow
banking and optimal shadow bank regulation by developing a bank run model featuring
the tradeoff between financial innovation and systemic risk. In my model, the traditional
banking sector is regulated such that it can credibly provide safe assets, while a shadow
banking sector creates space for beneficial investment opportunities created by finan-
cial innovation but also provides regulatory arbitrage opportunities for non-innovative
banks. Systemic risk arises from the negative externalities of asset liquidation in the
shadow banking sector, which may lead to a self-fulfilling recession and costly govern-
ment bailouts. Heavy regulatory punishment on systemically important shadow banks
controls existing systemic risk and has a deterrent effect on its accumulation ex ante. My
paper is the first to formalize the designation authority of a macro-prudential regulator
in systemic risk regulation.
I then switch from the assets side to the liabilities side on the bank’s balance sheet.
Chapter 2 introduces informed agents to the banking model and proposes a novel role
of deposit insurance in fostering market discipline. While the moral hazard problem
brought by deposit insurance weakens market discipline, I show that the opposite can
be true when the insurance stabilizes uninformed funding and increases the benefits of
monitoring through information acquisition. Knowing the bank asset type, informed de-
positors utilize the demand deposits as a monitoring device and discipline the bank into
holding good assets. However, self-fulfilling bank runs initiated by uninformed deposi-
tors erodes the future returns, inducing more depositors to forgo information acquisition
and act like uninformed depositors. A novel role of deposit insurance emerges from the
strategic complementarity between monitoring efforts and stability of uninformed fund-
ing. A capped deposit insurance, by stabilizing the retail funding of the bank, restores
wholesale depositors’ monitoring incentives and benefits market discipline.
I examine the role of information in generating bank runs in Chapter 3, where I ex-
plore the relationship between redemption price and run risks in a model of money mar-
ket fund industry. Money market funds compete with commercial banks by issuing de-
mandable shares with stable redemption price, transforming risky assets into money-like
claims outside the traditional banking sector. Floating net asset value (NAV) is widely
believed a solution to money market fund runs by removing the first-mover advantages.
In a coordination game model a la Angeletos and Werning (2006), I show that the float-
ing net asset value, which allows investors to redeem shares at market-based price rather
than book value, may lead tomore self-fulfilling runs. Compared to stable net asset value,
which becomes informative only when the regime is abandoned, the floating net asset
value acts as a public noisy signal, coordinating investors’ behaviors and resulting in
multiplicity. The destabilizing effect increases when investors’ capacity of acquiring pri-
vate information is constrained. The model implications are consistent with a surge in
the conversion from prime to government institutional funds in 2016, when the floating
net asset value requirement on the former is the centerpiece of the money market fund
reform.
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Chapter 1
Regulating Shadow Banks: Financial Innovation versus Systemic Risk
1
1.1 Introduction
Shadow banks played a central role in the 2007-09 financial crisis, the largest recession
in the nearly eighty years since the Great Depression. Regulatory arbitrage is recognized
as the main driver of the growth of the shadow banking system. Shadow banks do not
face the same regulation as traditional banks, and the difference in regulation is the main
driver of the growth in shadow banking. Shadow banks are able to circumvent tradi-
tional bank regulation because of how they are organized: Instead of taking deposits
and making loans within a single entity, the shadow banking system issues non-deposit,
money-like claims backed by financial assets created from a diverse range of loans and
works through intermediation chains, in which shadow banks interact with one another
and jointly perform the same liquidity, maturity and credit transformation roles as tradi-
tional banks. Enormous systemic risk thus accumulates outside the traditional regulatory
framework1.
Bringing shadow banks back under the regulatory umbrella is the focus of post-crisis
reforms. Most notably, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(DFA) of 2010 established the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and granted
the council the statutory power to designate systemically important non-bank financial
institutions and subject them to enhanced prudential standards. However, the effect of
this unprecedented regulatory authority on the shadow banking system is understudied.
My paper fills this gap by developing a model to investigate the optimal design of
shadow bank regulation under a tradeoff between financial innovation and systemic risk.
In my model, the traditional banking sector is regulated such that banks are prohib-
ited from excessive risk-taking and therefore credibly provide safe financial claims. By
conducting financial innovation, innovative shadow banks create a superior category of
risky assets and operate outside traditional regulation. However, non-innovative shadow
1 See, for instance, Pozsar et al. (2010) and Gorton and Metrick (2010)
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banks disguise themselves as innovative banks and contaminate the sector.
Moreover, the deterioration of asset quality may disrupt the interbank market and
lead to a self-fulfilling crisis. The accumulation of systemic risk in the shadow banking
sector causes a time-inconsistency problem for the regulator, who cannot commit not to
extending the liquidity backstop to all shadow banks. The optimal regulation on shadow
banks underscores the importance of reducing systemic risk and thus bailout costs and
can be achieved through the deterrent effect of designationwhen the regulator has limited
inspection capacity.
The baseline model consists of households, firms and banks. Firms need funding to
invest in projects. Households are born with endowments, while banks are penniless.
Patient households are indifferent between early and late consumption, while impatient
households care only about early consumption. Banks intermediate between firms and
households, producing diversified portfolios of individual firm projects and issuing asset-
backed financial claims to raise funding from households 2.
I introduce an endogenous financial innovation process to generate both bright and
dark sides of risk taking. In my model, financial innovation is defined as the process
of creating a new financial technology, which can be interpreted as research and de-
velopment in the screening technology 3 rather than motivated by avoiding taxes and
regulation 4. Banks that innovate are able to produce superior risky assets, which have
higher expected returns than safe and inferior risky assets produced by the old technol-
ogy. Banks, each of which is randomly matched with a household and unable to observe
the preference types of the household, issue asset-backed financial claims to raise fund-
2 To focus on the difference between traditional and shadow banking, I abstract from the complex
shadow banking system and condense the long and intertwined intermediation chain into one entity, with-
out loss of the essence of shadow banking as an unregulated sector.
3 For instance, Laeven, Levine and Michalopoulos (2015) provides a Schumpeterian model to character-
ize the dynamics of financial innovation, which helps screen entrepreneurs’ capability to perform techno-
logical innovation and is therefore always beneficial to the economy.
4 The tax- or regulation-evasion motives for financial innovation are discussed in Silber (1983), Miller
(1986), Tufano (1989), Allen and Gale (1994), Merton (1995), and more recently, in the form of securitization
such as in Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2012) and Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2013).
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ing from unsophisticated households, which cannot distinguish asset types. I capture the
risk-shifting nature of debt contracts by assuming that given the interest rate, banks al-
ways invest in risky assets. Non-innovative banks take excessive risks and hold inferior
risky assets, while the risk-taking of innovative banks is socially optimal. Banks with
different innovation costs endogenously choose whether to conduct innovation.
I begin with a long-term financial contract with no maturity mismatch and no liq-
uidity risk. Only patient households participate in banking, and impatient households
will remain in autarky. Banks cannot commit to holding safe assets, and there is only one
banking sector with risky assets. Non-innovative banks disguise themselves as innova-
tive banks. The equilibrium depends on the fraction of banks with low innovation costs,
which captures the degree of popularization of financial technology. When the mass of
low-cost banks is small, they will be crowded out of the market due to a prohibitively
high interest rate. As the mass increases, there will be a separating equilibrium in which
only innovative banks participate in banking, while non-innovative banks cannot afford
the interest rate, and this is eventually replaced by a pooling equilibrium in which non-
innovative banks enter the market. This prediction is consistent with the anecdotal evi-
dence/pattern that the deterioration of asset quality coincides with a market boom.
To add maturity mismatch and systemic risk into my model, I incorporate the fi-
nancial innovation process in a bank run model to demonstrate how the non-innovative
banks, despite representing a small fraction of the total, can destabilize the financial sys-
tem. To attract impatient household, the banks offer demandable financial claims with
both short- and long-term interest rates. Households can redeem the claims in either
period 1 or period 2.
I propose a new strategic complementarity mechanism, whereby households run on
the banks out of a fear of pecuniary externalities in the financial asset market. When
facing early redemption requests, banks holding superior risky assets are able to borrow
from sophisticated outside investors in the interbank market under a mark-to-market col-
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lateral constraint, while banks holding inferior risky assets are not and thus have to file for
bankruptcy and liquidate their assets, which has pecuniary externalities. Liquidation of
inferior risky assets has an adverse effect on the underlying projects, which overlap with
those composing superior risky assets, and as a result reduces the value of superior risky
assets. Given other households’ redemption behavior, patient households would demand
early redemption if the total redemption exceeds the threshold value andwouldwait until
the second period otherwise. Note that the early redemption request by the patient house-
holds will increase the amount of liquidation of inferior risky assets, which exacerbates
the consequences for the economy. In anticipation of this development, sophisticated
investors in the interbank market would refuse to lend to banks holding superior risky
assets, leading to more asset liquidation. This negative feedback loop induces strategic
complementarity among households and contributes to a self-fulfilling bank run, where
the interbank market collapses, market liquidity evaporates, all assets are liquidated, and
the economy is in a crisis state.
To capture the market friction from pecuniary externalities caused by inefficient as-
set liquidation, I examine government intervention through a regulator and “lender of
last resort” (LOLR), which captures the key roles of a central bank. A regulator able to
distinguish all types of assets (symmetric information) can implement the first-best al-
location by imposing differentiated regulation based on the asset types. The traditional
banking sector is regulated such that it can credibly provide safe assets, while the shadow
banking sector is intentionally subject to lighter regulation to encourage investment in su-
perior risky assets. For example, the regulation can be implemented through two sets of
risk-based capital requirements: one on traditional banking, which imposes a high risk
weight on all risky assets to prevent risk-taking activities, and the other on shadow bank-
ing, where the high risk weight only applies to inferior risky assets to prevent excessive
risk-taking but allow for beneficial innovation.
The major difficulty in shadow bank regulation is distinguishing between innovative
5
banks and non-innovative banks, both of which hold risky assets. Recognizing the fact
that the regulator is less informed than financial intermediaries regarding the nature of
financial activities, I depart from the benchmark case by introducing asymmetric infor-
mation. Under asymmetric information, the regulator is less informed than the banks
and cannot distinguish between superior and inferior risky assets ex ante. The traditional
banking sector is regulated such that it can credibly provide safe assets and has access
to the government liquidity backstop (public liquidity), while an unregulated banking
sector creates space for superior risky assets produced by financial innovation and bor-
rows from the interbank market (market liquidity). However, When the regulator cannot
distinguish between superior and inferior risky assets, bad banks holding inferior risky
assets disguise themselves as good banks to circumvent existing regulation. The regula-
tory difference provides arbitrage opportunities for banks that take excessive risks, which
contaminates the unregulated sector (shadow banking). The systemic risk causes a time-
inconsistency problem for the regulator in providing public liquidity, which exacerbates
excessive risk-taking in the shadow banking sector.
The regulator faces a tension between fostering financial innovation and reducing
systemic risks. I propose a new approach to shadow bank regulation that highlights the
deterrence effect. The regulation comprises two parts: inspection capacity and punish-
ment severity. Each bad shadow bank has a probability of being designated as a sys-
temically risky entity and facing the costly regulation and punishment. The regulator,
which can only identify the true types of a fraction of banks, can increase the punishment
on identified bad shadow banks to deter them from conducting regulatory arbitrage and
taking excessive risks ex ante. Under effective deterrence, only good shadow banks oper-
ate in shadow banking, while banks that do not innovate choose to remain in traditional
banking and hold safe assets.
My paper is the first to formalize the effect of the designation authority of the FSOC,
established under Title I of the DFA of 2010, on systemically important unregulated non-
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bank financial institutions in controlling risk accumulation in the shadow banking sector.
The model demonstrates that given asymmetric information and limited inspection re-
sources for shadow banks, heavy punishment is critical to deliver effective regulatory
deterrence, which justifies burdensome regulation on the designated systemically impor-
tant financial institutions (SIFIs).
The designation has a macro-prudential impact not only by controlling the existing
systemic risks of the designated but also by deterring excessive risk-taking behavior by
the undesignated. I propose that for a regulator with asymmetric information and limited
resources, interim regulation is more desirable than ex ante regulation and ex post inter-
vention. Instead of establishing a market entry requirement, the regulator requires infor-
mation disclosure and constantly monitors the underlying risks. Rather than intervening
after risks materialize, the regulator can take preemptive measures, such as SIFI designa-
tion, living wills and orderly liquidation authority, to curb the risk-taking activities of an
intermediary to avoid it becoming “too systemic to fail". The proactive regulatory mea-
sures not only reduce the systemic risks of a designated intermediary but also, and more
important, deter the excessive risk-taking incentives of undesignated intermediaries. The
deterrence effect increases the effectiveness of interim regulation, reducing systemic risk
while fostering financial innovation.
Furthermore, I go beyond the specific designs of FSOC and examine the optimal
regulation under information and enforcement constraints 5, which is distinct from clas-
sical economic theory where the regulator is an omnipotent social planner with perfect
information. In my model, a constrained regulator helps deliver the first-best through
the deterrence power of supervision and designation. The effectiveness of deterrence de-
pends on the regulator’s inspection capacity and punishment intensity, the latter of which
should be large enough to remove shadow banks’ opportunistic mindset. Therefore an
5 First, the regulator is less informed than the market participants. Even when detailed information
is disclosed per requirement, the regulator may not be able to assess the underlying risks of all financial
activities due to limitations posed by manpower, time, expertise, and other resources.
7
over-punishment ex post can be desirable ex ante.
The key to solving the problem is to reduce systemic risks in the financial system
before they materialize. The government should place greater emphasis on ex ante regu-
lation and prevention than on ex post rescue and bailouts. Expanding deposit insurance
to shadow banks will eliminate bank runs but also cause a severe moral hazard problem.
An implicit government guarantee or expected bailout falls into the same category. The
crisis has the symptoms of a liquidity dry-up, but the injection of public liquidity or the
provision of a government guarantee during the crisis will exacerbate the moral hazard
problem, contributing to the mispricing of risks in the market ex ante.
Empowering the regulator is essential for the effectiveness of regulation. Studying
the optimality and effects of the FSOC is important for both academia and practitioners.
It will advance the literature on financial stability and regulation and will offer an analyt-
ical framework to policymakers, highlighting the desirability of FSOC-style regulation in
handling the tension between fostering financial innovation and maintaining stability.
The optimal design of the regulatory framework for the financial system also matters
for monetary policy, since the migration of activities from the traditional to the shadow
banking systemwill increase unregulated money creation and weaken the effects of mon-
etary policies. A better understanding of financial regulation helps us to improve the
effectiveness of monetary policy.
My paper contributes to several strands of literature on banking, financial interme-
diation and regulation.
Firstly, I develop a unified model to analyze the bright and dark sides of shadow
banking. The rapidly growing literature on the role played by shadow banks in the run-
up to the 2007-2009 financial crisis has greatly enhanced our understanding of the nature
of the crisis and the dark sides of shadow banking. See, for instance, Gorton and Metrick
(2012) and Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2013) on securitization and the repo market,
Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2013) on ABCP conduits, and more recently, Chernenko
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and Sunderam (2014), Schmidt, Timmermann and Wermers (2016), and Xiao (2018) on
money market funds (MMFs) and Dang, Wang and Yao (2014), Wang et al. (2016), and
Allen et al. (2017) on China’s shadow banking system.
However, the shadow banking sector is modeled in these papers to bemore risky and
undesirable, while the regulator is assumed as a social planner who has the information,
ability and willingness to implement optimal regulation, which may not be entirely true
in the real world. Some papers start to view the shadow banking sector differently, recog-
nizing the fact that the regulator is often less informed than the banks in terms of making
investment decisions. The new tradeoff faced by the regulator is between preventing
excess risk taking and giving the banks the flexibility to capture profitable investment
opportunities. As shown in Ordonez (2018), the shadow banking sector can be welfare-
improving since it provides “a channel to escape excessive regulation that is asymmet-
rically more valuable for banks with access to efficient investment opportunities". Ruan
(2018) shows that shadow banking fills the gap of bank loan supply induced by regulation
using data of surrogate intermediaries in China. Particularly, Ruan (2018) highlights how
shadow banks could be beneficial complements to state-controlled traditional banking in
making small- and medium-sized loans.
These findings on both the dark and bright sides of shadow banking provide useful
ingredients for theoretical modeling. In my paper, the shadow banking sector accommo-
dates both beneficial financial innovation and excessive risk-taking activities, consistent
with this empirical evidence.
Furthermore, I incorporate systemic risk in the form of negative externalities of asset
liquidation into a classical bank run model to characterize financial contagion and the ra-
tionale for government intervention. This brings together the classical banking literature
on demandable financial claims and maturity mismatch problem, for instance, Bryant
(1980), Diamond andDybvig (1983), Jacklin (1987), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Alonso
(1996), and Donaldson and Piacentino (2017), and the more recent financial contagion lit-
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erature on fire sale and spillover effects such as Chernenko and Sunderam (2014) and
Schmidt, Timmermann and Wermers (2016). With the realistic model settings, I go one
step further and examine how regulation should be designed to mitigate the systemic
risks generated by shadow banks, rather than taking the regulatory framework as given.
Secondly, I propose a new approach to optimal financial regulation, which contribute
to studies on the expanded regulation on shadow banks. Shadow banks play dual roles
in fostering financial innovation and accumulating systemic risk and the optimal shadow
bank regulation is different from that on traditional bank. The topic is new, and the field
is understudied. Farhi and Tirole (2017), where “special depositors and borrowers” are
at the core of the analysis, proposes ring fencing between regulated and shadow bank-
ing. Ordonez (2018), which is the most closely related paper to mine, demonstrates that
taxing the shadow banks and subsidizing regulated banks can implement the first-best
allocation, since only those with superior risky assets will afford the tax and raise fund-
ing through shadow banking. However, it is a challenging task to determine the tax base
and tax rates of various types of shadow banking activities. Moreover, the policy recom-
mendation, which imposes a tax on efficient shadow banks to subsidize inefficient ones,
seems counter-intuitive and places the former at a disadvantage.
As the FSOC has already been established for nearly a decade and has been exercis-
ing its supervision and designation authority since 2013, it is more relevant to examine
the desirability of FSOC-style regulation on shadow banks. Particularly, the FSOC em-
phasizes nonbank financial companies that pose a threat to U.S. financial stability, tar-
geting those that contribute most to systemic risk and government bailout expectations.
This precise focus of regulation not only helps to prevent another financial crisis but also
avoids burdening small- and medium-sized financial institutions.
Thirdly, I contribute to the literature on optimal financial regulation 6. The exis-
6 The paper also enriches the literature on general regulation, where (the threat of) punishment is widely
used in areas of environmental protection and food security but rarely studied in the context of the financial
industry. These areas may differ in terms of the unforeseeable financial risks and consequences (different
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tence of shadow banks significantly weakens the effect of regulation on traditional banks,
which can bypass regulation bymoving activities off their balance sheets through shadow
banking. Simply tightening existing regulation will induce more migration from tradi-
tional banks to shadow banks, as shown in Plantin (2014), Huang (2015) and Begenau and
Landvoigt (2016). While these papers have done an excellent job in investigating the im-
pact of shadow banks on the effectiveness of traditional bank regulation, they focus only
on the dark side of shadow banking. They also fail to provide analysis of the potential of
the regulator to expand the range of regulation and bring all financial activities under the
same regulatory umbrella, which is exactly what the FSOC was created to accomplish.
Instead of imposing an exogenous regulatory framework on bankers, I show how differ-
entiated regulation emerges as an optimal response to the market. This explains why we
see both regulated and unregulated financial intermediaries (usually playing the same
credit, liquidity and maturity transformation roles) coexisting in equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents a newmodel
with endogenous financial innovation and analyzes the optimal regulation under sym-
metric information. Section 1.3 examines the roles played by the traditional and shadow
banks when the regulator is less informed than the banks but more informed than house-
holds. In Section 1.4, I examine the time-inconsistency problem faced by the regulator and
demonstrate how the optimal shadow bank regulation reduces systemic risk and thus
serves as a commitment tool against ex post bailouts. Section 1.6 discusses the practice
of the FSOC in exercising its designation authority and offers policy recommendations.
Section 1.7 concludes the paper.
from crime), but share many common points such as systemic risk, contagion, and government interven-
tion.
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1.2 The Baseline Model
1.2.1 The Environment
I begin with a baseline model where a unit-mass continuum of agents live for three pe-
riods, t = 0, 1, 2. Each agent is born in period 0 with an endowment of one unit wealth
and consume in period 1 (early consumption c1) and period 2 (late consumption c2). The
agents are risk-neutral and patient with a utility functionU(c1, c2) = c1+ c2. Agents have
access to the risk-free storage technology, which returns one-for-one every period.
There are firms in need of funding to finance long-term projects which take two peri-
ods to finish. However, the agents face prohibitively high costs of monitoring, verification
and contract enforcement and thus cannot directly provide funding to the firms. In other
words, the direct financial market is not viable. In autarky, households store their wealth
in period 0 and consume their wealth in period 1 and period 2, c2 = 1  c1.
1.2.2 Banks and Financial Innovation
I motivate the role of financial intermediaries, which I refer to as “banks", by their advan-
tage over agents in monitoring firms. Banks make loans to firms and raise funding from
agents through financial claims. Specifically, I assume the banks can produce two types
of assets out of firm loans: safe (type- f ) and inferior risky (type-i). The payoff of safe
assets, R f , is a constant greater than one 7. The inferior risky assets default and become
worthless with probability q and succeed and return Ri with probability 1  q.
In addition to the traditional assets, banks may obtain access to a superior category of
risky assets (type-s) through financial innovation (for instance, research and development
in the financial industry to improve screening and risk management skills). Specifically, I
assume that the risky assets have the same probability of default, but superior risky assets
7 Safe assets include but are not limited to U.S. treasuries and securities backed by them. Loans to
creditworthy clients with sufficient, quality collateral are also considered “safe". The business model has
matured: e.g., abundant historical data to trace back for analysis, time-proven methods to screen borrowers
and manage risks, state-of-the-art models to evaluate collateral.
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maintain a positive residual value Ra 2 (0, 1) upon default and return Rs > Ri in period
2 when successful.
Assumption 1 (Payoffs of Assets). The payoffs of assets satisfy the following assumptions:
1. Rs > Ri: The payoffs of superior risky assets strictly dominate those of inferior risky ones;
2. (1  q)Rs + qRa > R f : The expected payoff of superior risky assets is higher than that of
safe ones;
3. (1  q)Ri < R f : The expected payoff of inferior risky assets is lower than that of safe ones.
I assume that the probability of project failure is neither too high nor too low, q 2




Financial innovation is not a free lunch. It incurs an upfront cost c 2 (0, 1) on a bank
that conducts innovation and banks differ in innovation costs. The innovation is socially
optimal only when its benefits (expected payoffs) outweigh its costs (innovation cost plus
opportunity cost). Prior to innovation, safe assets are preferred to risky assets, therefore
the socially optimal innovation strategy is characterized by c, where
c = 1  R f
(1  q)Rs + qRa (1.2.1)
Since it can observe each bank’s innovation cost and asset type, the social planner will
only allow banks with innovation costs lower than the threshold value c to innovate and
hold superior risky assets, while force the rest of the banks to produce safe assets. In the
first-best allocation, two banking sectors coexist: a traditional banking sector composed of
banks that hold safe loans and an innovative banking sector composed of banks holding
8 When q > q¯, safe assets are preferred to superior risky assets, and the financial innovation technology
becomes worthless. If q < q, inferior risky assets have positive expected net value and may even generate
higher yields in expectation than safe assets, whichmakes risk-taking desirable all the time, and the analysis
of excessive risk-taking no longer matters.
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superior risky loans. Both sectors are protected by the liquidity backstop. The coexis-
tence of traditional and innovative banking encourages efficient financial innovation and
prevents the creation of inferior risky assets.
Note that the threshold value of the socially optimal innovation strategy depends
solely on the payoffs of safe and superior risky assets. I denote q(c˜) as the fraction of
banks with innovation costs lower than a threshold value c˜. Given c˜, the correspond-
ing value of q measures the level of popularization of frontier technologies. With the
advancement of technology, q increases and more banks adopt the low-cost innovation
technology, which facilitates the financing of superior risky assets.
1.2.3 Laissez-faire Banking
We now turn to the market equilibrium, where prices (interest rates) replace the social
planner’s commands and agents cannot observe the banks’ innovation costs and asset
holdings. I begin with laissez-faire banking to demonstrate market frictions and then
analyze how government intervention improves social welfare.
Timeline. At the beginning of period 0, each agent is randomly assigned a bank hold-
ing assets and issuing financial claims to raise funding from the agents. Banks choose
whether to innovate and which type of firm to make loans to and propose a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to raise funding from households. Households choose between remaining
in autarky and participating in banking. In period 2, projects are finished, and asset pay-
offs realize. Households redeem their claims and consume. Banks retain the residual
value of the proceeds.
Although the inferior risky assets are not socially desirable, the risk-shifting nature
of the debt contract may induce banks to take excessive risks:
Assumption 2 (Excessive Risk-taking Incentives). Given interest rate r,
1. (1  q)(Ri   r) > R f   r: Banks that do not innovate prefer inferior risky assets to safe
assets;
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2. (1   q)[(1   c)Rs   r] > (1   q)[(1   c)Ri   r]: Banks that innovate prefer superior
risky assets to inferior risky assets.
Assumption 2 excludes the possibility of a credible commitment by unregulated
banks. Non-innovative banks have incentives to deviate from holding safe assets to hold-
ing inferior risky assets, of which the expected payoff falls below the original endowment.
The excessive risk-taking incentive constrains banks’ ability to issue safe claims, and un-
sophisticated households lack effective tools to discipline banks’ risk taking behaviors.
Banks choose to innovate only if the innovation cost is small enough to make in-
novation more profitable than holding inferior risky assets, (1   q)[(1   c)Rs   r] >
(1  q)(Ri   r), namely when
c < 1  Ri
Rs
 cˆ (1.2.2)
Here, the innovation strategy depends on the payoffs of risky assets upon success.
This is because the banks make profits on the upside of the assets while the agents receive
all the residual values on the downside. When Ri increases, the threshold value cˆ de-
creases, meaning that more banks will be lured into holding inferior risky assets instead
of creating superior assets. The model captures the deterioration of asset quality during
economic booms 9.
Generally, cˆ is different from c. I assume cˆ < c. In this case, the banks with
c 2 (cˆ,c), which should have innovated in the first-best allocation, choose not to do so
because holding inferior risky assets is more lucrative than investing in R&D. The fraction
of innovative banks shrinks from q(c) to q(cˆ). This is because non-innovative banks take
9 When different probability of success is assumed (qs for superior risky assets and qi for inferior risky
ones), then the threshold value of innovation strategy becomes
c < 1 
1 qi
1 qs (Ri   r) + r
Rs
 cˆ0
The analysis above still applies and the new threshold value becomes smaller when the probability of de-
fault of inferior risky assets (1  qi) decreases. Hence an additional implication emerges: during economic
booms, where the default risk is small, more banks will prefer inferior risky assets to their superior coun-
terpart which requires innovation costs.
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advantage of the asymmetric information and disguises themselves as innovative banks.
The pooling of superior and inferior risky assets increases the financing cost of innovative
banks, crowding out good banks which should innovate.
Since they cannot distinguish assets, the agents make decisions based on their beliefs
on the pool of innovative and non-innovative banks, which face the same interest rate.
The interest rate offered by the banks makes the agents indifferent between participate in




In laissez-faire banking equilibrium, a fraction of q(cˆ) banks conduct financial inno-
vation and gain access to superior risky assets, while the rest of the banks remain non-
innovative and hold inferior risky assets.
The social welfare under laissez-faire banking is SWLZ = q(1  c)[(1  q)Rs+ qRa] +
(1  q)(1  q)Ri. There are several inefficiencies in laissez-faire banking: Firstly, excessive
risk taking by non-innovative banks raises the funding cost of innovative banks, which
would in some cases crowd out the latter. Secondly, innovation incentives are distorted
since low-cost banks are tempted to create inferior risky assets. Thirdly, an excessively
large shadow banking sector reduces the desirability of the overall banking sector, which
is plagued by excessive risks and may no longer be viable. Due to the lack of commit-
ment in creating safe assets, financial intermediation may break down and the benefits of
banking have to be forgone.




(1  c)[(1  q)Rs + qRa]  (1  q)Ri (1.2.4)
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1.3 Traditional and Shadow Banking
A regulator with symmetric information restores the first-best allocation from laissez-faire
banking by imposing regulation based on the types of asset holdings. The regulation is
as follows: (1) Only f -banks are permitted in the traditional banking sector, where banks
credibly produce safe short-term financial claims; (2) only s-banks are allowed to operate
in the innovative banking sector; and (3) i-banks will not be granted banking licenses.
One example of such regulation is risk-based capital requirements, as illustrated in ? 10.
Note that the regulation is lighter in the innovative banking sector than in the tradi-
tional banking sector in the sense that banks are allowed to hold risky assets. When the
regulator has perfect information regarding the true types of bank asset holdings, the dif-
ference in regulation creates space for socially desirable risk-taking by allowing innova-
tive banks to operate. However, when the regulator cannot distinguish between superior
and inferior risky assets ex ante, the license-granting regulation in the innovative bank-
ing sector is ineffective creates regulatory arbitrage opportunities 11 for non-innovative
banks, which, under symmetric information, can only survive by holding safe assets in
the traditional banking sector.
10 Suppose that each bank is endowed with k, which cannot be used for investment but can be seized
when the bank fails. The regulator can impose risk-based capital requirements on banks to prevent exces-
sive risk taking. The regulation consists of a capital requirement (minimum capital-to-asset ratio) Y and a
vector of risk weights on assets w = (w f ,ws,wi)0. The regulator requires a bank’s risk-adjusted capital-to-
asset ratio to be higher than the threshold value. To foster financial innovation while preventing excessive
risk taking, the regulator adopts different capital requirements, YTB and YSB, on traditional and shadow
banks, respectively. Given the risk weights, an effective capital requirement on the traditional banking
sector is satisfied only by f -banks, while an effective capital requirement on the shadow banking sector is









11 For instance, commercial banks or bank holding companies establish special purpose vehicles, or con-
duits, to move lending activities off their balance sheets. The conduits issue asset-backed commercial paper
or repos to obtain wholesale funding in the money market, rather than demand deposits. Another exam-
ple is when non-bank financial institutions, such as investment banks, insurance companies and finance
companies, engage in such activities.
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1.3.1 Imperfect Regulation
Assumption 3 (A Regulator with Imperfect Information). The regulator is able to distinguish
between safe and risky assets but not between superior and inferior risky assets in period 0.
The assumption captures the reality that the regulator has superior information col-
lection ability than common households but is less informed than the banks. Under asym-
metric information, i-banks disguise themselves as s-banks and apply for a license in in-
novative banking. Thus, the innovative banking sector is contaminated and becomes a
shadow banking sector accommodating both innovative and non-innovative banks.
Still, the traditional banking sector improves welfare by providing a commitment
device for banks to hold safe assets. The regulator only grants f -banks license to oper-
ate in the traditional banking sector. The regulation can be enforced perfectly since the
regulator can distinguish between safe and risky assets.
However, the innovative banking sector now becomes a shadow banking sector which
non-innovative banks can use to circumvent traditional bank regulation and take exces-
sive risks. It creates space for good shadow banks (s-banks) that innovate and create
superior risky assets and providing regulatory arbitrage opportunities for bad shadow
banks (i-banks) that do not innovate and produce inferior risky assets.
The market equilibrium is characterized as follows: Banks follow sequential strate-
gies. The first is an innovation strategy: Conditional on the bank’s innovation cost, it
chooses whether to conduct financial innovation, that is, 1A: c ! f1, 0g, where A de-
notes the choice of conducting financial innovation. The second is a financing strategy:
Conditional on the bank’s access to assets, it chooses the probability sF of using shadow
banking to raise funds. The third is an asset holding strategy: Conditional on the inno-
vation strategy and the regulatory environment, the bank chooses the type of assets k to
make loans to K: 1A ! fs, i, f g. The participation constraint of households is satisfied.
Banks prefer shadow banking to traditional banking when the expected profit of the
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former is larger than that of the latter: namely (1  q)[(1  c)Rs   rSB] > R f   rTB for
innovative banks and (1  q)(Ri   rSB) > R f   rTB for non-innovative banks. Hence we
have
Innovative banks: rSB <
1
1  qrTB + (1  c)Rs  
R f
1  q (1.3.1)
Non-innovative banks: rSB <
1
1  qrTB + Ri  
R f
1  q (1.3.2)
Denote sl the probability household believes that low-cost banks will raise funding
in shadow banking and sh the probability of high-cost banks participating in shadow
banking. Therefore the fraction of shadow banks hold superior risky assets is given by
s =
qsl
qsl + (1  q)sh (1.3.3)
I focus on equilibria in which these beliefs are correct, as in Ordonez (2018). Given




Hence, given the agents’ beliefs, banks adopt the following threshold strategy: low-
cost banks will participate in shadow banking if s > s1 and participate in traditional
banking otherwise, while high-cost banks participate in shadow banking if s > s2 and
participate in traditional banking otherwise, where s1 =
[R f (1 q)(1 cl)Rs]
q(1 cl)Ra , s2 =
[R f (1 q)Ri]
q(1 cl)Ra ,
and s1 < s2.
There are three main implications of the equilibrium: First, the first-best allocation,
represented by (sl, sh) = (1, 0), cannot be sustained as an equilibrium. When s = 1, the
interest rate in shadow banking is so low that high-cost banks will make more profits by
migrating their activities to the shadow banking sector. The deviation of high-cost banks
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Figure 1.1: Coexistence Equilibrium of Traditional and Shadow Banking
reduces s, but as long as s > s2, the high-cost bank will have incentives to deviate from
traditional banking to shadow banking.
Second, there is an equilibrium in which all banks remain in traditional banking.
When s < s1, even the low-cost banks cannot afford the high interest rates in shadow
banking. The decrease in sl triggers a downward spiral, where a lower s reinforces the
incentives to leave shadow banking. In equilibrium, sl = sh = 0.
Third, there is an equilibrium in which traditional and shadow banks coexist. Low-
cost banks will participate in shadow banking as long as s > s1. When s 2 (s1, s2),
high-cost banks will shift away from shadow banking, which decreases s and eventually
brings s back to s2. When s > s2, high-cost banks in traditional banking will be attracted
to shadow banking, which increases sh and reduces s. Thus, in equilibrium, it must be
that s = s2.
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1.3.2 Coexistence Equilibrium
Let us now focus on the case in which innovative and non-innovative banks coexist in the
shadow banking sector, namely when the quality of risky assets deteriorates.
At (sl, sh) = (1, sh ), all innovative banks will participate in shadow banking, while
high-cost banks will participate in shadow banking with a probability sh . Given sh =
sh , no low-cost banks will deviate from the strategy sl = 1, since their expected profit
in shadow banking is higher than that in traditional banking. Given sl = 1, no high-
cost banks will deviate from the strategy sh = sh . A higher sh decreases s and makes
traditional banking more profitable, which will reduce sh. Similarly, a lower sh increases
s and makes shadow banking more lucrative, which will bring shback to the equilibrium
level.
In the coexistence equilibrium, the size of shadow banking is sSB = q + (1  q)sh ,
while the size of traditional banking is sTB = (1  q)(1  sh ). Due to regulatory arbitrage,
the size of shadow banking is larger than the first-best.
Note that in the coexistence equilibrium, the participation constraint of high-cost
banks is binding, while that of low-cost banks is slack. The interest rate in the coexistence
equilibrium thus makes marginal non-innovative banks indifferent between participating
in traditional or shadow banking:
rSB =
1
1  qrTB   (
R f
1  q   Ri) (1.3.5)







q + (1  q)shRa (1.3.6)
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R f   (1  q)Ri   1] (1.3.7)
1.3.3 Welfare Comparison
Given the equilibrium (sl , s

h ), the welfare of the coexistence equilibrium is given by
SWTBSB = (1  q)(1  sh )R f + q(1  c)[(1  q)Rs + qRa] + (1  q)sh (1  q)Ri (1.3.8)
The shadow banking sector is welfare-improving compared to the case where only
traditional banking is permitted if SWTBSB > SWTB. That is to say, completely shutting




(1  c)[(1  q)Rs + qRa]  R f
R f   (1  q)Ri (1.3.9)
The above equation is satisfied as long as (1  c)Rs > Ri, which is the assumption.
Hence the coexistence equilibrium is always preferred to the traditional banking-only
equilibrium.
1.3.4 Comparative Statics
It is interesting to see how the equilibrium depends on the fraction of banks with low
innovation costs, which captures the degree of popularization of the financial technol-
ogy. When the mass of innovative banks is small, they will be crowded out due to a
prohibitively high interest rate in a market plagued by excessive risk taking. As the mass
of innovative banks increases, there will be a separating equilibrium in which only in-
novative banks participate in banking. However, it is eventually replaced by a pooling
equilibrium, in which non-innovative banks enter the market to exploit the low interest
rate. Note that the deterioration of asset quality occurs only when the fraction of inno-
22
vative banks is sufficiently large that non-innovative banks can “ride the boom”. This
prediction is consistent with the anecdotal evidence/pattern that the deterioration of as-
set quality coincides with relatively high average quality.









1.4 Shadow Bank Regulation
The aim of the shadow bank regulation is to reduce systemic risk and thus provide a
commitment tool to not provide a liquidity backstop to shadow banks. I show that the
combination of inspection and punishment prevents non-innovative banks from taking
excessive risks and achieves the first-best allocation even when the regulator has imper-
fect information.
1.4.1 Deterrent Effect of Designation
By requesting non-public information from banks, the regulator is capable of learning the
underlying risks of banks’ asset holdings. By investing in its inspection and research ca-
pacity, it is able to identify the true types of a fraction h 2 (0, 1) of banks holding risky
assets in period 1. The shadow bank regulator chooses (1) the capability of inspection h
and (2) the severity of punishment D for identified i-banks. Under the regulatory frame-
work (h,D), each shadow banker has a probability h of being identified.
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Examples of punishment measures include fines, forced liquidation/divestiture, and
additional capital charges. For instance, since its designation, GE Capital has decreased
its total assets by over 50 percent, shifted away from short-term funding, and reduced
its interconnectedness with large financial institutions. Further, the company no longer
owns any U.S. depository institutions and does not provide financing to consumers or
small business customers in the United States. Another example is AIG, which has re-
duced the amounts of its total debt outstanding, short-term debt, derivatives, securities
lending, repurchase agreements, and total assets. The company has sold certain non-core
businesses, such as its aircraft leasing and mortgage guaranty businesses, and reduced its
risk.
Proposition 1 (Optimal Designation Policy). Given the inspection capacity h, the deterrence
effect of shadow bank regulation is effective as long as the additional punishment is larger than the
threshold value D(h), where
D(h) = 1  h
h
(1  q)(Ri   rSB)  1h (R f   rTB)
Proof. Given the regulatory framework, an i-bank will be identified in period 1 with prob-
ability h. However, if undetected, it will secure a banking license to operate in the shadow
banking sector. A non-innovative bank prefers traditional banking to shadow banking
only when the profits of the former are larger than the expected profits of regulatory ar-
bitrage.
Hence an effective inspection capacity h satisfies:
(1  h)(1  q)(Ri   rSB) + h(0  D) < R f   rTB (1.4.1)
The punishment in the shadow banking sector should be effective in ensuring that
only superior risky assets will be financed using s-claims. Given the interest rate rSB,
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banks will be deterred from excessive risk-taking if D > 1 hh (1  q)(Ri   rSB)  1h (R f  
rTB)  D.
A regulation is defined as optimal if the regulated market achieves the first-best allo-
cation. The optimal regulation is not limited to the implementation of a direct revelation
mechanism, where banks tell the truth about their asset types. As long as the low type
(here, i-banks) are prevented from pooling with the high type, the regulation is optimal.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Shadow Bank Regulation). The shadow bank regulation with effective
deterrence prevents non-innovative banks from taking excessive risks and achieves the first-best
allocation.
Low-cost banks have no incentives to deviate from the equilibrium since the profit
fromdeviation is lower. High-cost bankswould like to deviate by participating in shadow
banking but are unable to do so under regulation Hence, low-cost banks will indeed inno-
vate, financing superior risky projects and raising funding in the shadow banking sector.
High-cost banks do not innovate and operate in the regulated traditional banking sector.
The insight is that shadow banking, defined as a sector issuing risky financial claims,
is part and parcel of the optimal regulatory design to foster innovation. Since private and
social interests are aligned when innovation is undertaken, unregulated banking with
entry approval is welfare improving.
For any supervision intensity h 2 [0, 1], there is a punishment level D that will de-
liver effective regulatory policy. The punishment power of the regulator over designated
banks generates a deterrent effect and improves welfare when the inspection capacity is
low. The supervision and designation can improve social welfare through the deterrent
effect, the effectiveness of which depends on the regulator’s inspection capacity h and the
magnitude of the punishment D. The effective punishment can be larger than the nega-
tive externalities generated by the bad banks to deter excess risk-taking activities when
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the regulator only has imperfect information and limited resources.
To effectively deter banks’ excessive risk-taking, the lower the inspection capacity is,
the larger the punishment should be. If the additional punishment’s upper bound is bind-
ing, more resources should be spent on increasing monitoring and inspection capacity
Under the optimal policy, since banks are deterred from investing in inferior risky
assets, the number of designated SIFIs is zero. Political pressure arises when inspection
is government funded. Punishment has deterrence power only when combined with
continuing monitoring effort, which is costly. Optimal designation policy incurs large
costs with no fine revenue and thus becomes a convenient target for political criticism
and abolition proposals.
The functional independence comes from fiscal independence. The shadow bank
regulator should be able to independently determine its budget and staffing. To imple-
ment the optimal designation policy, the assessment fee should be imposed on nonbank
financial institutions under review, regardless of whether they are designated.
Moreover, the supervision and punishment regulation can be applied to all types
of financial intermediaries, so that the first-best allocation can be achieved in the com-
plex shadow banking sector. Therefore, to make the deterrent effect work, the shadow
banks must have sufficient capital or company assets to ensure credible punishments.
For instance, transfers from parent companies, capital requirements, licenses and permits
ensure that that a company cannot enter bankruptcy while leaving nothing left to be pun-
ished.
The rationale for a capital requirement is as follows: (1) It is more resilient to return
volatility (loss-absorbing capital buffer); (2) it aligns public and private interests (pre-
vents excessive risk-taking); and (3) it ensures credible punishment (under asymmetric
information).
Heavy punishment is necessary to deter bad shadow banks by removing the oppor-
tunistic mindset and creating a credible threat. The effectiveness of deterrence depends
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on the regulator’s inspection capacity and punishment severity andmay achieve the first-
best allocation. Policy implications are discussed below regarding the role played by the
FSOC and SIFI designation. This paper also analyzes the effect of investor composition
on the design of financial contracts and regulation.
While regulatory arbitrage is believed to be the main driver of shadow banking ac-
tivities, shadow bank regulation is more than closing regulatory gaps and differences. In
contrast to traditional banks, the shadow banking system is complex and intertwined,
spanning across all financial industries, including securities, insurance, asset manage-
ment and various financial markets.
The liquidity shortage caused by maturity mismatch in financial intermediation can
be mitigated by the central bank through public liquidity creation. Thus, a timely in-
tervention by the central bank during a liquidity crisis can prevent financial contagion
and pecuniary externalities due to asset fire sales by constrained financial intermediaries.
Thus, why does the government not extend deposit insurance to all demandable financial
claims that could suffer from a run? In fact, the U.S. government provided guarantees for
the MMF industry shortly after the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008.
1.5 Systemic Risk and Credibility of Designation
In this section I examine the case where the designation is sub-optimal: the punishment
severity is smaller than the optimal case so that non-innovative banks still have incentives
to operate in the shadow banking sector.
With the random inspection and imperfect designation punishment, banks choose to




1 qRi   h(Ri   rSB)  11 qhD
Rs
 cˆ0 (1.5.1)
Denote q0 the fraction of innovative banks under the new innovation strategy. Now
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it is a function of not only the payoffs of risky assets, but also the designation policy, the
punishment severity, and the interest rate in the shadow banking sector.
In the coexistence equilibrium, the size of shadow banking is s0SB = q
0 + (1  q0)sh,
while the size of traditional banking is s0TB = (1  q0)(1  sh).
Again, the interest rate in the coexistence equilibrium thus makes high-cost banks
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According to households’ participation constraint, the interest rate should satisfy:
r0SB =
1
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R f   (1  q)Ri + h[(1  q)Ri + D  rTB]   1] (1.5.4)
1.5.1 Maturity Mismatch and Liquidity Risk
To generate strategic complementarity in a model in which one bank is matched with one
household, I impose a sequential selling constraint in the asset market in period 1, where
banks unable to borrow from sophisticated investors line up to sell their assets.
Denote j =
R
i ji as the total amount of liquidation of risky assets in period 1. I
assume that when j  j˜, where j˜ 2 ((1   q)l,l), the crisis state will be triggered,
where the payoffs of risky assets will be postponed to a remote period 3. In the interbank
lending market, if sophisticated investors observe j < j˜, they will lend to banks holding
risky assets. When j  j˜, adding the flavor of pecuniary externalities and a mark-to-
market borrowing constraint, I assume a sequential lending constraint: Only the first qj˜
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banks will be able to close the deal, while the remaining banks in line fail to find any
lenders accepting risky assets as collateral. The frozen interbank market forces the banks
to file for bankruptcy, leading to more asset liquidation.
I solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium through backward induction: First, given
households’ beliefs and redemption strategy, derive a bank’s innovation and asset hold-
ing strategies. Then, given the mix of assets in the banking sector, determine households’
redemption strategy and assess whether the households’ participation constraint is satis-
fied. To close the solution to the equilibrium, calculate banks’ expected profits to assess
banks’ participation constraints.
Given their beliefs, patient households decide whether to demand early redemption.
When the belief is j < j˜, a patient household who chooses to wait will obtain a higher
expected payoff in period 2 since rLF  1. However, if the belief is j  j˜, patient house-
holds will demand early redemption: They will receive one unit of funding if their banks
are the first j˜ in line to borrow in the interbank market and zero if their banks are not
among the first j˜ banks or if they choose to wait until period 2. Therefore, patient house-
holds will adopt a threshold strategy: Demand early redemption if j > j˜, and wait if
j < j˜.
The liquidation of inferior risky assets has negative externalities. Upon liquidation,
the underlying projects are discontinued, which has an adverse effect on the productivity
of projects composing superior risky assets and as a result reduces the market price of
superior risky assets. For instance, the fire sale of a house due to the low-income owner’s
delinquency on his mortgage will lower the prices of all other homes on the block, even
when these owners have sufficient incomes to meet the mortgage payment. However,
when the market price of houses drops below the remaining mortgage payments (“un-
der water”), good owners may strategically default on their payments, leading to a new
round of delinquencies and fire sales and eventually a crisis in which superior risky assets
are worthless.
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The negative feedback loop induces strategic complementarity among households
and leads to a self-fulfilling bank run, where the interbank market collapses, market liq-
uidity evaporates, all assets are liquidated, and the economy is in a crisis state. Despite
the different setting, my model derives the same sunspot equilibria as in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), where the self-fulfilling prophecy results from the sequential service con-
straint of a bank matched with a continuum of households. Here, the strategic comple-
mentarity results from the negative externalities in asset liquidation and contributes to
the multiplicity of equilibria. The good equilibrium can be sustained when only impa-
tient households demand early redemption and banks holding superior risky assets are
able to borrow from the interbankmarket. The total amount of liquidation is (1  q)l, and
the crisis state is not triggered. However, there is also a bad equilibrium of self-fulfilling
runs, where all households demand early redemption and the interbank market freezes,
which forces banks to liquidate assets and triggers the crisis state.
The self-fulfilling crisis captures the liquidity evaporation in the interbank lending
market, when lenders become extremely cautious and conservative in purchasing such
financial assets or providing funding to such types of banks. The contagion effect among
banks and the asset liquidation channel of systemic risk are salient features of the 2007-
2009 financial crisis and the emphasis of post-crisis regulatory evaluation.
When low-cost banks innovate, the liquidity backstop breaks even in expectation if
s(1  cl)[(1  q)Rs + qRa] + (1  s)(1  q)Ri  1, which requires
s  1  (1  q)Ri
(1  q)(1  cl)Rs + q(1  cl)Ra   (1  q)Ri (1.5.5)
Note that the right hand side of the inequality is smaller than s2 =
[R f (1 q)Ri]
q(1 cl)Ra .
When low-cost banks do not innovate, the liquidity backstop never breaks even.
However, regardless of whether the low-cost banks innovate, the regulator has to pro-
vide a liquidity backstop to prevent the crisis state, which presents a time-inconsistency
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problem in public liquidity injection
While banks that choose to innovate prefer superior risky projects, non-innovative
banks deviate from the first-best allocation by investing in inferior risky assets and taking
excessive risks. The deviation makes the composition of assets in the financial indus-
try riskier, which has two adverse effects on social welfare. First, it lowers the expected
payoffs in the good state, since inferior risky assets yield less than safe assets in expecta-
tion. Second, it increases the probability of the bad state because the inferior risky assets
contaminate the asset liquidation market and may trigger a liquidity seize-up.
Expecting the regulator to step in and provide guarantees on and extend loans to
shadow banks, households then have no incentives to run on the banks. There will be
no liquidation risks, but the bailout expectation will induce a moral hazard problem and
mispricing in the asset market. Shadow banks are able to finance inferior risky assets
without facing a penalty or market discipline. The accumulation of systemic risk in the
shadow banking sector reinforces the bailout expectation.
I have derived the banks’ strategies given the households’ strategy and beliefs. To
complete the equilibrium, I will derive the households’ redemption strategy in this sec-
tion. When sl = sh = 0, only the traditional banking sector exists. The public liquid-
ity provision is riskless, and only impatient households will demand early redemption.
When sh > 0, however, s-banks are pooled with i-banks in the shadow banking sector.
When the regulator does not provide the liquidity backstop to shadow banks, shadow
banks facing early redemption requests have to liquidate their assets.
In the bad equilibrium, without the liquidity backstop provided by the regulator,
shadow banks have to liquidate their assets, which leads to fire sales and triggers the
crisis state, where the payoffs of assets are postponed to a remote, indefinite period 3. A
fraction 1  j˜ of households, patient or impatient, cannot consume in period 1 or period
2, because the market freezes and the assets cannot be sold.
The welfare-maximizing regulator has to step in, taking unsold assets and extending
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loans to these banks so that households will be able to consume. Given the inevitability
of ex post rescue, the regulator could do better by extending its LOLR function to shadow
banks prior to the triggering of crisis state.
With the liquidity backstop provided by the regulator, there will be no forced liqui-
dation in period 1, and the crisis state will not be triggered. A household demanding
early redemption will always receive r1, and a household that does not demand early
redemption expects to receive (1  q)r+ s(1  cl)Ra in period 2.
The difficult task faced by the regulator results primarily from asymmetric informa-
tion. While financial intermediaries know clearly whether they are conducting benefi-
cial innovation or disguising themselves as innovative banks, the regulator, which has
less information regarding the nature of financial activities, cannot immediately identify
whether the the risky claims are backed by superior or inferior risky assets. For instance,
suppose now that mortgages are extended to people with lower FICO scores, who, based
on historical statistics, would have been rejected. This could be because the financial
intermediaries have applied more advanced technology than FICO scores to assess the
credit risks of borrowers (SOFI), but it could also be the case that the new form of lending
is used to mask the poor quality of underlying assets.
The regulator faces a dilemma between fostering financial innovation and preventing
excessive risks when considering extending the capital regulation to the whole financial
industry 12. When innovation technology is not available (i.e., q = 0), the only risky assets
available are inferior ones. The first-best allocation can be achieved by prohibiting risk-
taking in the traditional banking sector and prohibiting all shadow banking activities. In
equilibrium, banks raise funding through regulated traditional banking (the only banking
sector), and only safe projects are funded.
12Technically, subjecting non-bank financial institutions to capital requirements involves many industry-
specific difficulties. For example, MMFs are financed primarily through capital, which satisfies the capital
requirement, but since the capital is mainly demandable equity, it has little loss-absorbing capacity andmay
even trigger a liquidity crisis when it breaks the buck, as exemplified by the Reserve Primary Fund in 2008.
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When innovative technology is introduced (i.e., q 2 (0, 1]), however, the aforemen-
tioned conventional regulation in the banking industry may not be optimal, since it pre-
vents excessive risk-taking at the cost of forgoing beneficial innovation opportunities.
Inferior risky assets can also disguise themselves under the cover of financial innovation.
An incompetent regulator that fails to curb excessive risk-taking by non-innovative banks
will also discourage innovative banks from investing in welfare-improving innovation
technology.
1.6 The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)
During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the financial distress at certain non-bank financial
companies contributed to a broad seizing up of financial markets and stress at other fi-
nancial firms. Many of these non-bank financial companies were not subject to the type of
regulation and consolidated supervision applied to bank holding companies (BHCs), nor
were there effective mechanisms in place to resolve the largest and most interconnected
of these non-bank financial companies without causing further instability.
To address any potential risks to financial stability posed by these companies, the
DFA established the FSOC, which brings together federal and state financial regulators
to look across the financial system to identify risks to financial stability, promote market
discipline, and respond to emerging threats to the stability of the U.S. financial system.
The designation authority distinguishes the FSOC from any other collaborative body
of financial regulators, which fills the regulatory gap and improves policy coordination.
Authorized by the DFA, the FSOC has the statutory power to designate any non-bank
financial institutions posing a threat to the U.S. financial system as SIFIs. The designated




A designation means that the FSOC has determined that “the company’s material finan-
cial distress, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of
the activities of the company could pose a threat to U.S. financial stability."
Since the establishment of the FSOC, four companies have been labeled SIFIs: Amer-
ican International Group (AIG) on July 8, 2013, General Electric Capital Corporation
(GECC) on July 8, 2013, Prudential Financial on September 19, 2013, and MetLife on
December 18, 2014. These non-bank financial institutions are large, complex, intercon-
nected with other major financial intermediaries and comparable to the largest U.S. BHCs
in terms of size of assets and nature of business. For instance, AIG was the third-largest
insurance company in the United States and one of the largest insurers in the world, oper-
ating across many different markets. Prior to the onset of the financial crisis, the company
expanded its operations to include non-insurance businesses. While the company’s strat-
egy, funding profile, and global footprint have changed greatly since the financial crisis,
AIG remains a large and complex company with meaningful non-insurance-related ex-
posures. During the intensification of the financial crisis in the fall of 2008, AIG became
the recipient of considerable government support, which was deemed necessary to avoid
an even larger financial disruption.
First, these non-bank financial institutions have the same maturity mismatch prob-
lem as traditional banks do and thus are subject to runs. This is either due to heavy
reliance on the wholesale short-term funding markets or because of their offering of fi-
nancial products with early withdrawal features. For example, GECC was a significant
issuer of commercial paper (CP) in the United States and was subject to rollover risks;
MetLife’s funding agreement-backed commercial paper (FABCP) constitutes a significant
portion of the company’s capital market financing activities, which is short-term and ex-
poses MetLife to investment renewal risks; a significant amount of Prudential’s U.S. life
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insurance policies are subject to early withdrawal and include a significant cash surren-
der value; and many of AIG’s life insurance and annuity products, while intended to be
long-term liabilities, have features that could make them vulnerable to rapid and early
withdrawals by policyholders.
Second, asset liquidation imposes significant externalities on other financial interme-
diaries and markets, particularly during a period of overall stress in the financial services
industry and in a weak macroeconomic environment, when liquidity dries up and price
swings can be magnified. For instance, material financial distress at GECC could trigger
a run onMMFs and lead to a broader withdrawal of investments from the CP market and
other short-term funding markets. The liquidation of a significant portion of Prudential’s
assets could cause significant disruptions to key markets including the corporate debt
and asset-backed securities (ABS) markets, and the severity of the disruption caused by a
forced liquidation of Prudential’s assets could be amplified by the fact that the investment
portfolios ofmany large insurance companies are composed of similar assets, which could
cause significant reductions in asset values and losses for those firms. A rapid liquidation
of AIG’s life insurance and annuity liabilities could strain AIG’s liquidity resources and
compel the company to liquidate a substantial portion of its large portfolio of relatively
illiquid corporate and foreign bonds, as well as ABS.
Third, the negative effects are amplified by the strategic complementarity among
market participants who have lost confidence in the financial strength of companies with
similar products or balance sheet profiles. For instance, in addition to the direct effects
of asset liquidation on financial markets, wide-ranging and rapid withdrawals by AIG
policyholders and the associated deterioration of AIG’s financial condition could cause
financial contagion if the negative sentiment and uncertainty associated with material
distress at AIG spreads to other insurers. In particular, if distress at AIG were to cause
concerns among policyholders at other insurers, those insurers could experience unan-
ticipated increases in surrender activity that could strain liquidity resources, potentially
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impairing the financial condition of multiple insurers across the industry, causing signif-
icant damage to the broader economy.
1.6.2 Enhanced Prudential Standards
Adesignation by the FSOC does not provide a non-bank financial companywith any new
access to government liquidity sources or create any authority for the government to bail
out the company if it fails. To the contrary, the DFA seeks to eliminate taxpayer-funded
bailouts of failing companies by subjecting them to stringent regulation prior to material
failure.
For example, since its designation, GE Capital has fundamentally changed its busi-
ness. Through a series of divestitures, a transformation of its funding model, and a cor-
porate reorganization, the company has become a much less significant participant in
financial markets and the economy. GE Capital has decreased its total assets by over 50
percent, shifted away from short-term funding, and reduced its interconnectedness with
large financial institutions. Further, the company no longer owns any U.S. depository
institutions and does not provide financing to consumers or small business customers in
the United States.
Another example is AIG, which has reduced the amounts of its total debt outstand-
ing, short-term debt, derivatives, securities lending, repurchase agreements, and total as-
sets. Capital market exposures to AIG have decreased, and the company has sold certain
businesses in which it held dominant market shares, rendering the company less inter-
connected with other financial institutions and smaller in scope and size. The company’s
focus on traditional insurance activities and its wind-down of non-core businesses, such
as the aircraft leasing and mortgage guaranty businesses, have reduced its risk.
As a result, the FSOC voted to rescind the designation of GE Capital on June 28, 2016,
that of AIG in 2017, and that of Prudential Financial on October 16, 2018 13. Currently, the
13MetLife challenged its SIFI determination with a lawsuit filed in the US District Court for the District of
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number of designated SIFIs is zero.
1.6.3 Identifying Emerging Risks
As history has shown, including in 2008, financial crises can be difficult to predict and
have consequences that are both far-reaching and unanticipated. Consistent with its mis-
sion to identify potential threats before they occur, the FSOC focuses on the potential con-
sequences of material financial distress at non-bank financial institutions, especially the
transmission of the negative effects of a non-bank financial company’s material financial
distress to the financial system.
There are three main transmission channels identified in the Interpretive Guidance
of the FSOC: exposure, asset liquidation and critical function or service 14. To support
the decision-making of the FSOC, the Office of Financial Research (OFR), created at the
same time, is responsible for collecting data and conducting analysis to identify emerg-
ing risks in the financial system and can use subpoena power to fulfill its responsibilities
when necessary. A significant amount of nonpublic information is collected and utilized
to identify the risks posed by some financial activities, as well as to determine the desig-
nation of SIFIs.
The creation of the FSOC brought significant changes to the post-crisis regulatory
regime. Not only has the regulatory perimeter, for the first time, been expanded to cover
Colombia in January 2015. The US District Court ruled in MetLife’s favor in March 2016, which the FSOC
appealed. However, after the change in the White House in January 2017, stays were issued in the case,
including an order holding the appeal in abeyance until the issuance of a report required to be made by the
Treasury Department, pursuant to an April 2017 Presidential Memorandum, after the Treasury Secretary
undertook a thorough review of the FSOC determination process. The case was eventually dismissed in
January 2018.
14Specifically, the FSOC evaluates whether (1) a non-bank financial company’s creditors, counterparties,
investors, or other market participants have exposure to the non-bank financial company that is signifi-
cant enough to materially impair those creditors, counterparties, investors, or other market participants
and thereby pose a threat to U.S. financial stability; (2) a non-bank financial company holds assets that, if
liquidated quickly, would cause a fall in asset prices and thereby significantly disrupt trading or funding in
key markets or cause significant losses or funding problems for other firms with similar holdings; and (3) a
nonbank financial company is no longer able or willing to provide a critical function or service that is relied
upon by market participants and for which there are no ready substitutes. For the purpose of my model, I
focus on the asset liquidation channel of systemic risks posed by these financial institutions.
37
all financial institutions including shadow banks, but the implementation approach has
been shifted from industry- to entity-based regulation. The macro-prudential regulator is
substantially empowered and is expected to reduce government bailout expectations and
help prevent another financial crisis.
Recognizing the FSOC’s potential as a macro-prudential regulator becomes even
more valuable when there are political trends in rolling back regulation. In recent years,
arguments against the FSOC (and the DFA at large) are increasing under fourmain points.
First, the expansion of the regulatory umbrella will impede financial innovation and
hence make it more difficult for firms to obtain funding and lead to a slower recovery
and a less vigorous economy. Second, the FSOC does not reduce, and will even reinforce,
the market’s expectation of government bailouts due to SIFI designation. Third, burden-
some regulation induces financial companies to reduce the variety of financial products
and services they offer and will disproportionately harm small banks and customers. Fi-
nally, FSOC designation weakens the global competitiveness of large financial companies
by placing heavier regulatory burdens on them.
I address these comments in my model and provide novel arguments for the recent
policy debates. I note that regulation of shadow banking is actually a necessary condition
to foster good financial innovation, which would otherwise be crowded out by bad actors
under asymmetric information. Moreover, by focusing on shadow banks with large sys-
temic risks and taking preemptive action before they become “too systemic to fail”, the
FSOC credibly reduces probability of future bailouts using taxpayers’ money while re-
lieving small- and medium-sized financial institutions of compliance costs. Furthermore,
the regulation protects unsophisticated households, which may not able to distinguish
between good risky and bad risky assets and may be exploited as a result. By promoting
beneficial financial innovation and reducing systemic risk, FSOC regulation can increase
the resilience of the financial system and contribute to a healthier and more competitive
economy in the long run, from which every market participant will benefit.
38
The prudential regulator is no longer in a reactive position; instead, it can take proac-
tive action to gather information and identify underlying risks, substantially reducing
expectations of a government bailout by containing systemic risk well before it poses an
eminent threat to the whole financial system.
Empowering the regulator is endorsing financial innovation and stability. Lax regu-
lation allows excessive risk-taking to crowd out beneficial innovation, eventually making
unsophisticated households suffer and leading to costly government bailouts. If we rec-
ognize the tendency of the leveraged financial system to take excess risks and the severity
of the too-systemic-to-fail problem, we will not be content with a regulator that is insen-
sitive to the ever-evolving financial industry and remains uninformed. The regulator
charged with macro-prudential responsibilities should be empowered and should not be
apologetic about wielding regulatory power in service of the welfare of the whole econ-
omy.
1.7 Conclusions and Future Research
The conventional wisdom of tightening the regulation to curb excessive risk taking has
been challenged since the financial crisis. Loosely regulated, the shadow banking sys-
tem enables financial intermediaries to bypass regulatory requirements and weakens the
effectiveness of financial regulation.
I propose a model where shadow banks are not necessarily bad for the economy and
stress on the positive force of shadow banks in fostering innovation. The model cap-
tures the bright side of shadow banking and sheds light on the optimal regulation design.
Due to the replacement effect a la Arrow, traditional banks hesitate to offer new financial
services, leading to inefficiency in investment. Shadow banks, however, enter into the
game with tech and financial innovations, which provides liquidity to firms in need. As
the shadow banking sector grows, the benefits of financial innovation are gradually out-
weighed by the threats of systemic risk. Once regulated, they will not be able to innovate
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as much due to costly capital charges. While the traditional banking sector is regulated
to credibly provide safe claims, a sector operating outside traditional regulation creates
space for innovative financial intermediaries to take risks. However, under asymmetric
information, the sector is contaminated by non-innovative banks seeking to circumvent
traditional regulation and take excessive risks, thus becoming a shadow banking sector.
The paper has important policy implications. First, the emergence of shadow banks
does not necessarily call for immediate regulation tightening. The regulatory authority
should recognize the usefulness of the unregulated sector and rethink the boundary of
regulation. Second, my paper is the first to formalize the designation authority of the
Financial Stability Oversight Council over non-bank financial institutions in controlling
risk accumulation in the shadow banking sector. The regulator, with imperfect informa-
tion and limited resources, faces a tradeoff between tightening regulation to maintain sta-
bility and loosening regulation to foster innovation. Third, I propose a new approach to
shadow bank regulation, highlighting the deterrence effect of inspection and punishment.
Levying heavy punishment on shadow banks detected as taking excessive risks is criti-
cal to deliver effective regulatory deterrence, which justifies burdensome regulation on
the designated systemically important financial institutions. The punishment has macro-
prudential impacts not only by controlling the existing systemic risks of the designated
but also by deterring excessive risk-taking behavior ex ante. Future research directions
include endogenizing the fire sale pricing in the asset market as well as empirical studies
on the deterrent effect.
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Chapter 2
Bank Liability Structure and Optimal Deposit Insurance
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2.1 Introduction
Traditional wisdom puts deposit insurance on the opposite side of market discipline, ar-
guing that the introduction of deposit insurance leads to moral hazard problem and will
induce more risk-taking by banks. This argument guides the discussion on the role of
deposit insurance and the design of risk-adjusted insurance premium for the purpose of
mitigating the negative effects.
However, shouldwe take themarket discipline prior to deposit insurance for granted?
My answer is no. By introducing agents with heterogeneous ability to acquire bank asset
information, I show that the deposit insurance on the uninformed funding can benefit
the market discipline efforts exerted by the informed agents. This provides a new ratio-
nale for capped deposit insurance and the optimal design of the insurance coverage limit,
which goes beyond the cost-benefit analysis between preventing bank runs and reducing
payout costs.
In my model, agents only differ in the ability of obtaining bank asset information. In
the exogenous case, the quality of bank assets is revealed to only a fraction of the agents,
who can then decide whether to act on that piece of information. In the endogenous
information acquisition scenario, agents who differ in wealth choose whether to exert
monitoring efforts and acquire more precise information regarding the bank’s balance
sheets. However, given the fixed monitoring cost, only wealthy depositors will choose to
exert efforts and become informed with regard to the underlying assets.
The leveraged bank has incentives to take excess risks by choosing bad assets, which
are riskier and less socially desirable than good ones. The market discipline, defined as
the agents’ efforts to curb the bank’s excessive risk-taking incentives, can be implemented
by a threat-to-run strategy by the informed agents. The strategy depends on the quality
of the bank assets revealed to informed agents in the interim period. The informed will
demand early withdrawal when the underlying assets are of bad quality and will wait
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when the assets are good. When the underlying assets are of good quality, the informed
agents choose to wait (and even lend more money) to stabilize the bank should there
be a panic-based run among uninformed depositors. The stabilizing effect of informed
funding creates an incentive for banks to discipline their investment decisions and hold
good assets, counting on the informed depositors come to their rescue during runs.
Due to the strategic complementarity in bank runs, the benefits of the information
advantage are affected by the bank’s liability structure, which in this case refers to the
relative size of informed and uninformed funding. When the size of liquidity that can
be deployed by the informed agents is relatively small, a distabilizing force emerges:
even when the underlying assets are good, the liquidity demand from the uninformed in-
vestors are so large than the bank has to liquidate (some of) the assets. This undermines
the return prospects of informed agents, causing them to forgo superior information and
run on the bank as well. Expecting this, depositors may choose not to acquire any addi-
tional information regarding the assets of the bank. The discouragement from exerting
monitoring efforts weakens the market discipline and leads to efficiency loss.
The model has two insights: First, it shows that market discipline efforts do not nat-
urally take place, even when some of the agents are handed with the necessary infor-
mation. Without deposit insurance, there can be no market discipline from the agents
anyways. Second, it implies that a capped deposit insurance, by stabilizing relatively
small- and medium-sized depositors of the bank, can restore monitoring incentives of
the large-sized depositors and benefit market discipline. Given the complementarity be-
tween strategies of informed and uninformed agents, eliminating bank runs initiated by
uninformed agents restores incentives for other agents to obtain private information and
use the short-term contract as a discipline tool.
My paper contributes to the literature on banking and applied corporate finance the-
ory besides offering a new angle in terms of optimal design of deposit insurance.
My paper builds on Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)’s techniques in obtaining a unique
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threshold equilibrium, with the emphasis on the market discipline and the monitoring
efforts through information acquisition, which was not studied in previous literature.
Their paper derives a unique equilibrium to pin down the probability of bank runs. Their
focus is on the optimal design of demand deposit contract with the tradeoff between the
benefits of risk sharing and the costs of more bank runs.
There are three distinctions inmymodel: The return is jointly determined by the state
of the nature (economic fundamentals), q, and the type of the loans, h. This distinguishes
my paper from Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), where the return R is a constant and the
state of the nature affects expected payoff only through the probability of success p(q).
Another difference is that in mymodel, the bank chooses to maximize its profit, instead of
the assumption in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) (and since Diamond and Dybvig (1983))
that banks are mutually owned by depositors and retain no residual value at the end
of the period. The changes in model setting enables the analysis on moral hazard and
market discipline, which is at the center of the debate on the optimal design of deposit
insurance.
Deposit insurance has been a classic topic in economic research since the Great De-
pression and has attracted attention from scholars and practitioners. There are three main
strands of literature: The first strand addresses the nature of deposit insurance, viewing it
as a put option and thus applying the state-of-art option pricing theory (Stoll (1969), Black
and Scholes (1973), Merton (1973a), Merton (1973b)) to evaluate the cost of the insurance.
For instance, Merton (1977) demonstrates an isomorphic correspondence between loan
guarantees and common stock pout options and then uses the well-developed theory of
option pricing to derive the formula. Several other papers deal with more specific pricing
mechanism about the risk-adjusted deposit insurance (Ronn and Verma, 1986).
The second strand examines market settings where deposit insurance can (or cannot)
be welfare-improving. Diamond and Dybvig’s influential paper in 1983 shows circum-
stances when government intervention through providing deposit insurance can produce
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superior contracts and therefore increase social welfare. They admit, however, that the
riskless technology they used in the model abstracts from potential moral hazard prob-
lem since there is no room for bank managers to select the risk of bank portfolios in an
unobserved way, and that “introducing risky assets and moral hazard would be an in-
teresting extension of our model". For instance, it has been analysed in complete market
settings where deposit insurance is redundant and can provide no social improvement
(Kareken and Wallace (1978), Dothan and Williams (1980)).
The third, and perhaps the most important strand of literature, focuses on the im-
pacts of deposit insurance on financial stability, using both theoretical and empirical ap-
proaches. Deposit insurance, on one hand, makes the deposit a real riskless asset and
enhances depositors’ confidence, therefore eliminating the bad equilibrium of bank runs.
On the other hand, like other insurances, due to asymmetric information (here, partly un-
observed bank managers risk-taking behaviors), the flat-rate deposit insurance gives the
bank managers incentives to pursue riskier investments with higher-expected returns,
hence making the financial system exposed to more risks. Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane
(2002) found evidence from cross-country data emphasizing on the importance of assess-
ing and remedying “weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments"
before a country adopts explicit deposit insurance. Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu
(2014) analyzed the comparative magnitude of the two effects of deposit insurance in dif-
ferent times. One of their conclusions is that the moral hazard effect of deposit insurance
dominates in good times while the stabilization effect of deposit insurance dominates in
turbulent times. Additionally, they found that good bank supervision can alleviate the
unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times.
Others, Keeley (1990) tests the hypothesis that increases in competition caused bank char-
ter values to decline, which in turn caused banks to increase default risk through increases
in asset risk and reductions in capital.
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2.2 The Baseline Model
2.2.1 The Setup
In the three-period (t = 0, 1, 2) model, there are a continuum of agents 1 , each endowed
with one unit of wealth in period 0. Agents face preference shocks as in Diamond-Dybvig:
their preference types will only be revealed in period 1. A fraction l of the depositors
is impatient, who only value early consumption c1, while the rest 1  l depositors are
patient and indifferent between early and late consumption.
The underlying projects take two periods to finish and can be either “good (k = G)"
or “bad (k = B)", which cannot be observed by depositors ex ante. If the project is inter-
rupted in period 1, the liquidation value is assumed to be one unit of initial investment
2.
The long-run return is jointly determined by the state of the nature (economic fun-
damentals), q, and the type of the loans, k. The state of the nature q is drawn at the
beginning of period 0 but is not revealed publicly. Once finished, type-k projects return
Rk per dollar invested with probability qk(q) and zero otherwise. I assume q follows a
uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1].
The expected payoff qk(q)Rk depends on both the types of loans and the state of the
nature. Specifically, I assume that good assets have higher expected payoffs than bad
ones, regardless of the realization of the state of nature:
1 Here, the households represent depositors with account balance below the deposit insurance limit.
Given account splitting and brokered deposit are not uncommon in reality, it is not that unrealistic to as-
sume full protection for depositors. Moreover, the design of the model leaves adequate room for analyzing
depositors who are not fully insured since they can be classified into the uninsured creditor group in the
model. Therefore, by assuming that depositors are fully insured, the model is greatly simplified yet doesn’t
compromise its ability to shed light on empirical questions.
2 I allow for variation in liquidation value in the extension, where the liquidation value of the project is
(1  d)A, where d characterizes the cost of asset liquidation. Alternatively, we can think of d as the haircut
rate when the bank uses the project as collateral to borrow money and the collateral is evaluated at its book
value. For now, d is a constant to simplify analysis. In the context of fire sale, as what happened during the
Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, it would be more appropriate to model the liquidation cost as an increasing
function of the amount of assets liquidated, probably a non-linear one.
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Assumption 4. Given the state of the nature q, (1) Good projects have higher expected payoffs
than bad projects: qG(q)RG > qB(q)RB; (2) The probability of success of good projects is higher
than that of bad projects: qG(q) > qB(q);
First-best allocation. The social planner knows the preference types of agents and
quality of assets. It maximizes the social welfare, defined as the sum of utilities:
max
cgt ,h
SW = E[lu(cm1 + c
m
2 ) + (1  l)u(cp1 + cp2)] (2.2.1)
subject to the resource constraint
lcm2 + (1  l)cp2 
8>><>>:
[1  lcm1   (1  l)cp1 ]Rh with prob. qk(q)
0 with prob. 1  qk(q)
(2.2.2)
In the first-best allocation, cm2 = c
p
1 = 0, u
0(cm1 ) = qh(q)R
hu0(cp2 ), and h
 = G. The
consumption of patient agents in period 2 is cp2 =
1 lcm1
1 l R
G with probability qG(q), and
zero otherwise.
2.2.2 Demand Deposits and Bank Runs
Fromnow on, I introduce a representative bankwhich raises funding from agents through
demand-deposit contracts and make loans to firms. The demand deposit contract (r1, r2)
promises to pay r1 per unit of wealth deposited in period 0 to depositors who withdraw
in period 1 (early withdrawal) and r2 to those who wait until period 2. In order to attract
depositors, banks will set r2  r1  1.
Denote n the fraction of depositors demanding early withdrawal. The upper bound
of r2 is given by
(1 nr1)R
1 n . When n < 1/r1, the bank is still able to stay in business, and
the expected profit is p(q, h)r1,r2,h = q
h(q)[(1  nr1)Rh   (1  n)r2]. The actual payment
in period 2 r˜2 is given by minfr2, 1 nr11 n Rhg.
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Profit-maximizing banks may be tempted to take on bad projects due to the risk-
shifting nature of debt contracts. That is, the bank cannot commit to making good loans.
This motivates the use of short-term funding contract as a commitment device. Specifi-
cally, I assume RG < RB and make the following assumption:
Assumption 5 (Excessive risk-taking incentives). Given (r1, r2, q), the bank prefers to make
riskier bad loans qB(q)[(1  nr1)RB   (1  n)r2] > qG(q)[(1  nr1)RG   (1  n)r2]
My paper distinguishes from others in the following three aspects: First, I allow for
socially undesirable assets to address the excessive risk-taking problem, instead of only
one category of assets which assumes away the bank’s investment choices.
Second, I change the demand-deposit contract so that the payment in period 2 is
a pre-determined amount rather than the residual value of investment. The demand-
deposit contract allows depositors to withdraw their money in both period 1 and period
2, with the one-period return of r1 and two-period return of r2 3.
Third, the bank maximizes its own expected profit rather than social welfare. The
new feature of the demand-deposit contract in my model places a wedge between the
total payoff of projects and the return of long-term deposits. The bank chooses the interest
rates specified in the demand-deposit contract, as well as the type of assets, to maximize
profits.
Information structure. Agents and banks have asymmetric information regarding
the fundamentals and the quality of bank assets. Different from agents, the bank is able
to observe the fundamentals and distinguish project types at the beginning of period 0
and makes decisions accordingly.
Timeline. At the beginning of period 0, nature draws the fundamental q from a uni-
form distribution over [q, q¯]. The bank observes the realized fundamentals immediately
3 In the appendix I examine the possibility of the bank offering two separate contracts to common and
wealth depositors, namely different rates for retail and wholesale funding. The incentives of using short-
term contracts still apply.
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and chooses asset type k to maximize its expected profit. At the beginning of period 1,
each agent receives a noisy private signal qi = q + ei, where ei is uniformly distributed
over [ e, e]. In period 1, the preference shock is also realized. Agents learn their own
preference types and decide whether to demand early withdrawal. The bank liquidates
(some) assets to meet the liquidity demand. In period 2, the return is realized. The bank
fulfills its payment obligations and retains the residual value (if any).
2.2.3 Benchmark: Equilibrium without Bank-asset Information
Consider the extreme case where all agents remain uninformed regarding the bank’s as-
sets. This brings us back to the Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) model, where a unique
equilibrium is pinned down.
Given excessive risk taking incentives, the bankwill always choose bad assets, namely
h = B.
v(q, fr1, r2g) =
8>><>>:
qB(q)u(r2)  u(r1) i f n < 1r1
0  1nr1u(r1) i f n > 1r1
(2.2.3)
When fundamental is good enough, banking is viable even when bad assets are in-
vested. No incentives to monitor since the participation constraint of the agents is always
satisfied.
2.3 Equilibrium under Exogenous Information Acquisition
Now suppose the bank asset information is exogenously revealed to a fraction w of pa-
tient depositors in period 1, who are thus referred to as informed depositors. I assume
that the bank asset information is perfect and reveals the true type of assets held by the
bank. The strategy of informed depositors is dependent on both the bank asset type k and
the state of the economy q. These informed depositors are viewed as a collective which
acts together, thus the fraction (1  l)w can also be interpreted as the relative wealth held
49
by one representative patient depositor. The rest (1  d)(1  l) patient depositors are un-
informed in terms of bank assets and only have a noisy signal about the fundamentals,
qi.
The equilibrium consists of depositors’ strategies of (1) withdrawal strategy: whether
to demand early withdrawal„ wi = f1, 0g, based on their preference types and private
signals, and bank’s strategies of (1) demand-deposit contract D = (r1, r2), (2) portfolio
strategy: which type of project to invest h = fB,Gg, which satisfy the profit-maximizing,
based on the signal q.
Theorem 6. When the fraction of informed agents w is within a certain range, there is a unique
equilibrium where informed agents run if the assets are bad (h = B) and do not run if the assets
are good (h = G), regardless of the fundamentals, while uninformed agents run if they observe a
signal below the threshold q and do not run above. The bank choose good assets.
The theorem can be used to calculate the proportion of early withdrawals. Denote A
the event where the informed agents decide to run on the bank. According to the strategy,
1A = 0 when k = G and 1A = 1 when k = B. The informed agents will not run in period
1 only if good assets are invested, while the uninformed agents who receive a signal
below the threshold will run. Thus, the proportion of early withdrawals is determined by
the fundamentals. Following Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), I use n(q, q0) to specify the
proportion,
n(q, q0) = l|{z}
impatient agents
+ (1  l)(1 w)prob(qi < q)| {z }
uninformed




The signal qi follows a uniform distribution over [q   e, q + e] since both the fun-
damentals q and the noise e are uniformly distributed. When q < q   e, the highest
signal observed by agents is below the threshold, thus all uninformed agents will run
on the bank, which means n(q, q) = l + (1  l)(1  w). When q > q + e, even the
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lowest signal observed by agents is above the threshold, therefore only impatient agents
would demand early withdrawal, namely n(q, q) = l. When q is within the inter-
val [q   e, q + e], the proportion of early withdrawals is given by the linear function
n(q, q) = l+ (1  l)(1 w)(12 + q
 q
2e ).
Given n, the bank will choose good assets only if pG > pB. I assume that the bank
has incentives to take excessive risks when the informed agents choose to wait no matter
which type of assets they observe, namely pB > pG given nj1A=0:
Assumption 7. When 1A = 0 8 k, pG   pB < 0, where
pG = qG[(1  nj1A=0r1)RG   (1  nj1A=0)r2]
pB = qB[(1  nj1A=0r1)RB   (1  nj1A=0)r2]
Denote DGB  qGRG   qBRB and Dq = qG   qB. When r2 < DGBDq , the inequality holds
for n > DGB   r2Dqr1DGB   r2Dq. When r2 > DGBDq , the inequality holds for all n 2 [l, 1].
Definition 8 (Effective and credible market discipline). The market discipline is effective if
pG > pB given the strategy of informed agents and pG < pB without. The market discipline
is credible if the aforementioned strategy satisfies the participation and incentive-compatibility
constraints of the informed agents.
In the model, it requires pGj1A=0 > pBj1A=1 for the bank and vjk=G > 0 and vjk=B <
0 for the informed agents.
Definition 9 (Pivotal mass of informed agents). The mass of informed agents is pivotal if
nj1A=1 > nˆ for any level of nj1A=0 < nˆ, where nˆ represents the mass of early withdrawals which
leaves bank zero profits.
When w is pivotal, the threat-to-run strategy is effective since pB = 0 and pG > 0.
To find out the smallest w to implement effective market discipline, I focus on the case
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where the mass of informed agents is non-pivotal, namely when w satisfies nj1A=1 < nˆ
for any level of nj1A=0 < nˆ.
When w is non-pivotal, effective market discipline requires qG[(1  nj1A=0r1)RG  
(1   nj1A=0)r2] > qB[(1   nj1A=1r1)RB   (1   nj1A=1)r2]. Denote D = r2(qG   qB)  
r1(qGRG   qBRB). The market discipline strategy is effective if the fraction of informed
agents is larger enough, w > w, where
w  [r2Dq   DGB]  D[l+ (1  l)prob(qi < q
)]
(1  l)[(qBRBr1   r2)  Dprob(qi < q)] (2.3.2)
Now let’s check whether the market discipline strategy is credible on the agents’
side. Given n and h, patient agents, informed or uninformed, will choose to wait if the
following differential is positive:
v(q, h, n, n˜) =
8>><>>:
qh(q)u(r˜2)  u(r1) if n < 1r1
0  1nr1u(r1) if n > 1r1
(2.3.3)
where
r˜2 = minfr2, 1  nr11  n R
hg =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
r2 if l  n  nˆ
1 nr1
1 n R
h if nˆ < n  1r1
0 if 1r1 < n  1
(2.3.4)
Three differences from the Goldstein and Pauzner paper: First, bank asset informa-
tion h. This gives informational advantage to some agents in order to examine the market
discipline mechanism when banks may take excessive risks. Second, the fraction of early
withdrawals when informed agents run n˜ = n+ (1  l)d. The informed agents act col-
lectively, and their withdrawal is no longer neglectible. Another interpretation is that the
informed agents are wealthy people and have larger stakes in the bank, thus they are
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motivated to acquire information or exert market discipline. Either way, the mass of in-
formed agents matters to the stability of the bank. Third, the expected payment in period
2 rˆ2. It is the smaller value between the amount specified in the demand-deposit contract
r2 and the residual value
1 nr1
1 n R
h. This allows the bank to earn a profit; otherwise the
banker’s and the depositors’ interests are always aligned, leaving no room for agency
problem.
The effective market discipline requires that v(q,G, n, n˜) > 0 and v(q, B, n, n˜) < 0
for all q. Note that v(q, h, n, n˜) is always negative when n˜ > 1r1 . That is to say, informed
agents will not run on good assets only under the prerequisite that n˜ < 1r1 , which requires





(1  l)(1  prob(qi < q))  w
 (2.3.5)
where n0 = l+ (1  l)prob(qi < q), which is the extreme cases where all patient
agents are uninformed about the bank asset information and therefore all follow a thresh-
old strategy.
From now on I assume w < w, i.e., the mass of informed agents is not pivotal.
Therefore we require
qG(q)u(r˜2)  u(r1) > 0 (2.3.6)
qB(q)u(r˜2)  u(r1) < 0 when n˜ < 1r1 (2.3.7)
Denote nˆ = R
h r2
Rhr1 r2 , which is mass of early withdrawals to make informed agents
indifferent between running on the bank and waiting when the future return is expected
to be higher than r2.
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Therefore n < nˆ requires
w >
l+ (1  l)prob(qi < q)  R
h r2
Rhr1 r2
(1  l)prob(qi < q) (2.3.8)
The bank chooses investment and pricing strategies to maximize its expected profit,
represented by the following equation:
ph = maxfqh(q)(1  nr1)Rh   (1  n)r2, 0g (2.3.9)
It will be disciplined into choosing good assets if the threat to run strategy of in-
formed agents is credible and important:
pG(n = n˜) > pB(n = n˜0) (2.3.10)
2.3.1 Equilibrium Analysis
By using the short-term contract as a monitoring tool, as in Rey and Stiglitz (1993), the
bank will find it optimal to hold good assets, even when there is no capital or regulation.











In period 1, informed depositors learn about the true type of the assets. The market
discipline is effective when the bank chooses the good assets for fear of runs of informed
54
depositors in period 1. An extreme case is when all agents are informed (w = 1) in period
1. The bank chooses good assets when the discipline is effective. This requires the mass
of informed depositors to be large enough. If n = l+ d(1  l) > 1/r1, then the run of
informed depositors is large enough to induce the bank to liquidate assets.
Moreover, the threat-to-run strategy is credible only if it is incentive-compatible for
informed depositors. There is a forbearance region where the informed depositors should
run as a discipline tool but is not credible when 1nr1u(r1) < qB(q)u(r2), or q > qˆB, where
qˆB = q 1B (
1
nr1
u(r1)/u(r2)). When q < qˆB, the threat-to-run strategy is credible. If the
uninformed patient depositors believe that the informed ones follow the discipline strat-
egy and will not run, then they also prefer to wait since u(r1) < qG(q)u(r2). Thus the
informed depositors will have a stabilizing effect if their deposits is large enough to pre-
vent the bank from liquidation assets.
2.4 Conclusion
Market discipline is not something we should take for granted. This paper studies the
liability structure of banks and a novel role of deposit insurance. While the moral haz-
ard problem brought by deposit insurance weakens market discipline, I show that the
opposite can be true when the insurance stabilizes uninformed funding and increases the
benefits of monitoring through information acquisition. Knowing the bank asset type,
informed depositors utilize the demand deposits as a monitoring device and discipline
the bank into holding good assets. However, self-fulfilling bank runs initiated by unin-
formed depositors erodes the future returns, inducing more depositors to forgo informa-
tion acquisition and act like uninformed depositors. A novel role of deposit insurance
emerges from the strategic complementarity between monitoring efforts and stability of
uninformed funding. A capped deposit insurance, by stabilizing the retail funding of




To Float or not to Float? A Model of Money Market Fund Reform
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3.1 Introduction
Systemic risks posed by the financial industry are rooted in its role in the creation process
of money. Through intermediation between households with savings and firms in need of
funding, financial institutions transform relatively long-term investments into demand-
able debts (bank demand deposits) or equities (money market fund shares), appealing
to households who might be hit by a preference shock before the maturity date. It is this
function performed by financial intermediaries that helps channel idle funds into produc-
tive projects, but at the same time subject them to the vulnerability of liquidity/maturity
mismatch.
While demand deposits have been thoroughly explored in classical banking models,
money-like claims fabricated by the shadow banking sector are still understudied. This
paper approaches the shadow banking money creation process from the perspective of fi-
nancial contracts and regulation. Traditional banks issue debt contracts embedding a call
option, while shadow banks sell equity contracts with a stable redemption price. I show
how the the equity share contract of money market funds is equivalent with demand de-
posit contract of commercial banks in providing liquidity achieving the socially optimal
allocation.
This paper models money creation in the shadow banking system. Shadow banks
(money market funds) issue equity shares to compete with demand deposits offered by
traditional banks. With homogeneous households, the two contracts are equivalent in
delivering the first-best allocation. Regulatory difference matters when heterogeneous
beliefs/asymmetric information are introduced.
The risk-sharing role of demand deposits has been explored in Diamond and Dybvig
(1983). The possibility of equity contract to serve the same purpose, nevertheless, receives
much less attention in academia. The concept of demand equity and its relationship with
demand deposits haven been analyzed in Jacklin (1987), which points out that trading
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constraints is essential in making deposit insurance work. Predictions or visions in these
papers have become truth, but we lack theoretical framework and tools to anatomize the
modern role played by MMMF. The debate over money market fund reform and its re-
versal calls for a closer examination of the nature of demand equity. Stiglitz (2001), Brun-
nermeier et al. (2009), and Armour et al. (2016) provide insightful and practical thoughts
on regulation in the revolving economy.
Several stylized facts about traditional and shadow banking:
1. MMFs emerge as competitors against traditional banks 1. They provide equity share
contracts similar to bank debt with on demand redemption, stable NAV and pay-
ment functions (defined as the exchange between MMF shares and bank debt in the
coexistence equilibrium?)
2. MMF shares are viewed as substitutes for deposits, almost as riskless as insured
deposits but with a higher yield. The clientele of MMFs largely overlaps with com-
mercial banks. The suffer similar run concerns which plagued traditional banks
before deposit insurance was put in place, and the incentives for MMF shareholders
to run is also the same as that for bank depositors: strategic complementarity.
3. The past some thirty years has witnessed how the supply of government securities
and a liquid secondary market is developed, and how a full-fledged (and even over
developed) financial markets can create private money and reduce financing cost,
as well as causing a global financial crisis.
4. It is also during this time that MMF industry experiences considerable growth, es-
pecially when money market funds started to provide payment services such as
check-writing and wire transfer. It plays an important role in the shadow banking
1Another extension is when the traditional bankers, instead of being abide by the regulation in the
banking industry, move lending activities off their balance sheets through ABCP conduits, which acquire
funding from MMFs.
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system, with the tipping point coming after Lehman filed bankruptcy in 2008 and
the Reserve fund announced breaking the buck.
Besides, regulatory policies matter. While traditional banks are under the heavy reg-
ulation in the banking sector, shadow banks are relatively lightly regulated in the se-
curities industry, conforming to information disclosure and investment category restric-
tions rather than capital requirement and stress-tests. Although not explicitly insured by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) like traditional banks, money market
funds were fully guaranteed by the government after the Lehman collapse.
Depending on the sophistication of investors, three types of regulation are evalu-
ated and are potentially welfare-improving: (1) capital requirement as discipline tool and
buffer ("regulate shadow banks like traditional banks"); (2) information disclosure and
floating net asset value to motivate market discipline ("regulate shadow banks like stock
market"); and (3) liquidity fees and redemption gates (2016 money market fund reform).
Government insurance/guarantee and large-scale asset buying program can also be ex-
amined. And empirical implications can be derived and tested using money market fund
data.
Themodel accentuates the importance of FSOC because a statutory power to regulate
all financial institutions across industries is vital to identifying shadow banking activities
and responding with specific regulatory measures. In addition, the regulation matters
not only for financial stability, but also for monetary policies because the migration of
activities from traditional to shadow banking system will increase unregulated money
creation and weaken the effects of monetary policies.
Given their vital role as a major source of funding in the short-term financing market,
the assets side of money market funds has been closely analyzed in various papers, for
instance, Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2013) on ABCP conduits, Dang, Wang and Yao
(2014), Wang et al. (2016), Allen et al. (2017) and Ruan (2018) on China’s shadow bank-
ing system, and especially, Chernenko and Sunderam (2014), Schmidt, Timmermann and
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Wermers (2016), and Xiao (2018) using MMF data. These analyses take it as given that
money market funds are banks without regulation, but still do not investigate why and
how they are able to create money-like claims.
Yet there has been little academic research which provides a theoretical framework
to analyze the regulatory design on newly-emerged financial sectors. Adrian, Shin et al.
(2009) and Gorton and Metrick (2010) propose some principles for regulating the ABCP
market and MMFs. These policy recommendations, however, are based on empirical
observations and history and lack formal analysis. Gordon and Gandia (2014) exam-
ines the run rates of European MMFs during the week when Lehman Brothers filed for
bankruptcy. The European MMFs offer a reasonable proxy for the distinction between
fixed and floating NAV since they are already issued in two forms, namely “stable NAV"
and “accumulating NAV." The authors find that the stable/accumulating distinction ex-
plains none of the cross-sectional variation in the run rate among these funds. Instead,
the fund’s portfolio risk and the sponsor capacity to support the fund carry much heavier
weights.
The rest of the paper is organized the following way: In Section 3.2, I summarize the
institutional background on money market fund (MMF) industry and the 2016 reform.
Section 3.3 presents a model with information coordination and derives the equivalence
between money market fund shares and demand-deposit contracts. Section 3.4 examines
the roles played by the net asset value as a public noisy signal and the equilibrium results
under stable and floating NAV regime. Section 3.5 concludes the paper.
3.2 Background on the Money Market Fund Reform
One of the most important lessons learned from the 2007-09 financial crisis is not much
different from those learned from other banking crisis and panics: beware of bank runs.
And, in the most recent case, beware of shadow bank runs. MMF were a major funding
source in the ABCP and repomarkets and contribute to the worsening of 2008-09 financial
60
crisis.
MMF is a type of mutual funds and comprises a percentage in the whole mutual fund
industry. The Rule 2a-7 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) grants critical
exemption to money market funds, allowing them to maintain a stable net asset value
(NAV) rather than use a floating one as do other mutual funds.
The earliest MMF was founded in the 1972, when Regulation Q governed the tradi-
tional commercial banking industry. It provided for common households the access to
the treasuries market, which had been restricted to the wealthy due to high investment
minimum. Apart from higher yields than deposit interest rates, MMFs also provided
check-writing function for shareholders. This payment function is critical for the popu-
larity of MMFs since it made the MMF shares convenient to use and thus a quasi-money
2.
In 2008, the Reserve MMF failed to maintain a stable value of $1 and broke the buck.
Panicked shareholders followed by waves of runs on several money market funds. The
consequences were so severe that the federal reserve had to intervene and provide full
guarantee on the shares.
There have been debates among regulators, scholars and practitioners over how to
reform theMMF industry, for instance Gorton andMetrick (2010). The reform bill, passed
by the Congress in 2014, has three features: mark-to-market accounting for institutional
prime funds 3, redemption gates and liquidity fees. Now MMFs have more tools to cope
with runs. The reform dramatically reshaped the MMF industry. The majority of insti-
tutional prime funds had converted to treasury funds to avoid the mark-to-market rule
before June, 2016, the implementation date.
2Retail money market funds are counted as one of the non-M1 components of M2, along with savings
deposits and small time deposits, in the Money Stock and Debt Measures released by the Federal Reserve
in the United States. M1 is the more narrowly defined measure which consists of the most liquid forms of
money, namely currency and checkable deposits. See https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/
about.htm for more details.
3Classification rules of MMFs
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3.3 The Baseline Model
3.3.1 The Setup
In this sections, the settings of a model with three periods, T = 0, 1, 2, are specified.
There is a continnum of households of unit mass, each endowed with one unit of
funds in period 0. The storage technology, which is cost-less and incurs no depreciation,
is available to all households.
Following the assumptions made in the seminal Diamond and Dybvig (1983), two
types of households are assumed to generate liquidity needs 4. A fraction l of the house-
holds are impatient (type-m), and the rest 1 l are patient (type-p). Impatient households
requires immediate consumption in period 1, while patient households treat consumption
in period 1 and period 2 as perfect substitutes.
Denote ci1 and ci2 the consumption chosen by type-i household for period 1 and 2,




U(cp1 + cp2) (patient/type-p)
The utility function is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable andU0() > 0,
U00() < 0. The relative risk aversion is assumed to be constant and larger than one.
Households are identical in period 0, and each have the same probability of being hit
by the liquidity shock; that is, revealed to be impatient. In period 1, each household will
find out its own type, which will only be revealed to itself (private information).
Households will choose the optimal consumption bundle (ci1, ci2) to maximize their
own expected utility, E[U(ci1, ci2)], given the investment opportunities and technologies
4This assumption follows Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and is consistent with the characteristics of de-
positors and MMF shareholders in comparison to stock market investors.
5Assume away the time preference, which will not affect the major conclusions in the model. In ap-
pendix I replace the current utility function of patient households with two different forms ofU(cp1 + bcp2)
or bU(cp1 + cp2), where b is the discount parameter, and the conclusions still go through.
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available.
Firms are established by entrepreneurs, who possess skills of doing business but have
no endowments 6. There are numerous entrepreneurs, and each owns a firmwith a project
in need of one unit of funding.
Projects are long-term and requires two periods to finish. Start with the assumption
that all projects are safe and each will yield a gross return Ys in two periods with certainty.
If interrupted in period 1, the fire sale value of the project will be ys = (1  L)Ys < Ys 7,
where Lmeasures the extent of liquidation loss.
A benevolent social planner with perfect information on household types and project
payoffs will maximize the following social welfare, since there is no aggregate uncer-
tainty.
maxfcm1,(cp1,cp2g lU(cm1) + (1  l)U(cp1 + cp2)]
subject to the resource constraint
(1  l)cp2 =
8>><>>:
[1  lcm1+(1 l)cp1ys ]Ys if ys  1
[1  lcm1   (1  l)cp1]Ys if ys < 1












With the ability to distinguish between patient and impatient households, the social
6An equivalent way is to assume insufficient internal funding.
7This captures the fact that projects are firm-specific assets; and the price an outsider is willing to pay
will be less than the value if the firm could continue the project. It could also be due to lack of bargaining
power in a fire sale.
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planner will allocate cm1 to each impatient households in period 1 and c

p2 to each patient
households in period 2.
The value of ys matters for liquidity reserve management. When ys  1, the social
planner will invest all funding in productive projects in period 0 and liquidate a fraction
of lcm1/ys of the initial investment in period 1. When ys < 1, it will hold a liquidity
reserves of lcm1 from period 0 to 1 and use the reserve to provide consumption for impa-
tient households.
Without loss of generality, assume ys = 1 for simplicity. When   cU
00(c)
U0(c) > 1, we
have cm1 > 1, which is better than the competitive market equilibrium where cm1 = 1,
cm2 = cp1 = 0 and cp2 = Ys 8.
Suppose there is a direct financing market where firms can issue equity stock and/or
debt contracts to households. In this simple model, the payoffs of projects are riskless and
known to all, therefore all firm incomes are pledgeable. Since there is no tax distortion nor
bankruptcy cost, the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds, and firms are indifferent between
equity and debt financing.
Suppose each household will purchase the stock/bond issued by a firm, which will
return Ys in period 2. Can households potentially do better by trading with one another
in a spot market period 1? In period 1, suppose each impatient household will sell its
financial claim on the firm at price p. The period 2 return of each claim will be Ys. By
liquidating their own projects, patient households get 1, which is the amount of available
funds that can be used to make purchase of claims and obtain a gross return of Ys/p in
period 2. Note that patient households are willing to liquidate own assets and buy claims
only if p < 1, while impatient households are willing to sell claims rather than to liquidate
projects only if p > 1. Therefore no trade will happen. The zero trading in the secondary
market is because ll households will invest in safe projects with no interim payments (no
interest nor dividend, since the project needs two periods to generate outputs). Therefore
8See Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for detailed analysis and proof.
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patient households has no extra funding in hand unless liquidating their own projects.
Will it be profitable to store cash in advance for the opportunity to purchase claims
in period 1?
Suppose a fraction a household, instead of investing in safe projects, decides to store
the one unit of funding in period 0. In period 1, households each receive a private in-
formation regarding their own types. If household who hoards money is impatient, the
consumption will be 1. If s/he is patient, s/he can purchase shares from impatient house-
holds at a price p < Ys. Note that if 1 < p < Ys, the hoarder will be better off by investing
in safe projects in period 0. But if p < 1, then impatient household will prefer liquidating
their assets than trading with the hoarder. In equilibrium, such spot market will not exist,
and risk-sharing is not achievable. This is because the financial claim issued by firms does
not specify an advance payment in period 1 (i.e., the financial claims are long-term) and
is essentially the competitive equilibrium in corporate finance terms.
Now let’s revise the direct financing contract a bit so that the firm will distribute a
payment (dividend/interest) of d1 per claim in period 1, and another payment (residual
dividend or principal payment plus interest) of d2 = (1  d1)Ys. In this case, the risk-
sharing is achieved through trading ex-dividend shares/ex-interest debt contracts in the
secondary market as in Jacklin (1987).
In period 1, the supply of ex-dividend equity shares in the secondary market is pro-
vided by impatient households at price P per share. As long as P > 0, impatient house-
holds are better off selling the shares. On the demand side, the patient households are
willing to pay P in period 1 to obtain the claim on realization value of projects d2 in
period 2 as long as P < d2.
The market-clearing condition is lP = (1  l)d1, the equilibrium price P = 1 ll d1.
Then the total consumption of impatient household in period 1 will be c1 = d1 + P = d1l ,
while the consumption of patient household in period 2 is given by c2 = d21 l =
1 d1
1 l Yj.
By setting d1 = lc1 , the direct financing contracts will achieve the socially optimal
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allocation. And there are no other equilibria: bank run possibilities are ruled out since
only impatient households will sell claims at price P , which acts as a device to separate
different types of agents and reveals information. This is because the equilibrium price of
financial claims will fall as a response to excess supply, eliminating strategic complemen-
tarity run motive we see in the case of demand deposits.
The obvious advantage of the direct financing market compared to financial interme-
diaries, which we’ll explore in next section, is that firms are not obliged to buying back
shares or paying back debts at a fixed price in period 1. The first-best allocation can be
delivered through trading among households, and long-term projects will never have to
be interrupted.
From now on financial intermediaries will be introduced. Financiers, who are pen-
niless, set up financial intermediaries, which attract savings from households and make
loans to entrepreneurs.
Financiers raise money from households either through equity (money market fund
shares) or through debt (demand deposits) contracts. Due to the uncertainty of patience
types, households favor contracts that provided liquidity in period 1. And only this type
of contracts will improve risk-sharing among households compared to the competitive
equilibrium.
The money creation process is like this: firms need funding to pay for capital and
labor, which are provided by households in exchange for payment. The funding either
comes from financial intermediaries, or from financial markets. A firm will choose a
certain source of funding which will be accepted by households who might be hit by a
preference shock. The means of payment will be accepted in period 0 only if its value in
period 1 is also specified in the contracts.
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3.3.2 Money Market Funds
Shadow banks also provide funding to firms through loans, but offer equities rather than
debts to households 9. The equity share contract transfers partial ownership of underlying
assets (firm loans) to shareholders. The fund pays dividend d1 per share in period 1 and
distribute all residual value d2 = (1  d1)Ys in period 2 per share.
Trading shadow bank shares in the secondary market is no different from trading
firm shares analyzed in the previous section, for the shadow bank is mutually owned by
its investors. Given the investors are homogeneous ex ante, the dividend policy will be
the same as the one designed by a representative agent.
Here, I’ll investigate another version of shadow bank share contracts where the trad-
ing in period 1 is conducted directly with the issuer, namely the shadow bank itself.
While the former version allows shareholders to trade ex-dividend equity shares in
a secondary market in period 1, the shadow bank in this version is obliged to meet the
purchase and redemption demand from investors10. If the price is purely determined by
investors’ supply and demand, then the shadow bank merely acts as a central market
place, which will not change the results derived in the secondary market trading model.
Therefore, the main focus is on the case where the shadow bank offers a fixed price to buy
and sell ex-dividend claims, which is exactly how the stable net asset value (NAV) works
in the real world.
Suppose the shadow bank offers to sell and buy back ex-dividend shares at a fixed
price f in period 1. The immediate result is that there will be zero trading volume in the
secondary market, even when it is not forbidden by the shadow bank. This is because
9That is, households have (partial) ownership of the shadow bank. This is different from investing in
the stock market and acquire (partial) ownership of the firm. Compared with directly participating in the
debt market and lending to firms directly, making loans through shadow banks allows for diversification
and less monitoring and verification costs. Most importantly, it provides much-needed liquidity through
maturity and liquidity transformation.
10This is different from corporate firms purchasing back shares in the secondary stock market; both prop
up the price of securities, but one is not compulsory.
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in the secondary market, (1) no buyers will offer a price higher than f since they can do
better by purchasing the share directly from the fund; (2) no seller will accept a price
lower than f, for selling the share back to the shadow bank is more appealing; (3) given
significant searching and transaction costs, sellers and buyers are more willing to directly
trade with the shadow bank instead of in the secondary market.
The impatient households will request redemption from the shadow bank and con-
sume d1 + f in period 1, while patient households will each purchase d1/f shares from
the shadow bank 11. The shadow bank can set f = to replicate the secondary market
allocation. The optimal allocation is achieved since all impatient shareholders would like
to make redemption with the fund in period 1, while all patient shareholders would like
to hold shares and wait until period 2. And when f = = (1  l)c1 and d1 = lc1 , the
demand for redemption lf is equal to the demand for new shares (1  l)d1, the shadow
bank does not need any upfront cash or liquidating assets. Essentially, this is equivalent
to maintaining a stable NAV fixed at one unit of fiat money per share while distributing
c1   1 = r1 dividend shares to early redemption and c2   1 = r2 dividend shares to late
redemption.
Again, due to maturity mismatch and liquidity loss, shadow bankers may not be able
to maintain the price f. Therefore, the familiar multiple equilibria problem resurfaces: be-
sides the first-best allocation, a bad, self-fulfilling run equilibrium exists. If a shareholder
expects all other shareholders to demand early redemption, s/he will also find it optimal
to follow the crowd, since the liquidation value of fund assets will not be enough to cover
all redemption requests, and the sequential service constraint applies 12.
Denote g the number of redemption requests received in period 1. If g < 1d1+f , the
status quo can be maintained by liquidating assets to meet the redemption requests. An
11Indeed, the dividends paid by money market funds are usually reinvested in the fund, increasing the
number of shares held by the investor.
12we can interpret each period represents at least a day, given that money market funds treats intraday
redemption requests equally.
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investor i will get
R˜(g) =
8>><>>:
d1 + f (early rdemption)
1 g(d1+f)
1 g Ys (late redemption)
If g  1d1+f , the status quo cannot be maintained since the value of redemption re-
quests exceeds the market value of all assets in period 1. The sequential service constraint
applies again: all requests received before a certain time period will be redeemed at the
stable NAV, while the rest will receive nothing 13.
The actual payoffs, R˜1 and R˜2, respectively, are dependent on g the number of early
redemption in period 1, and gi the the number of early redemption requests before in-
vestor i. Without loss of generality, assume an investor i will get
R˜(g,gi) =
8>><>>:
d1 + f (early rdemption, gi < 1d1+f )
0 (redemption, gi > 1d1+f
This is especially true when the liquidation process of the shadow bank is long and
complex, which means that investors have to wait an indefinite number of periods to get
their shares redeemed. There will be sufficient incentives for investors to request early
redemption 14 Here, another important role played by deposit insurance authority is to
provide quick and orderly liquidation.
In the context of MMF shares, the sequential service constraint captures the differ-
13It might be an exaggeration to say that late redemption will get nothing back, but it doesn’t harm the
generality of the model’s conclusion. After all, according to documents regarding the Reserve Primary
Fund’s decision-making the day after the Lehman bankruptcy, the redemption requests the Fund received
before 3:00pm on Sep 16, 2008 were still redeemed at the $1 per share stable NAV, while those requests after
3:00pm were subject to a seven-day redemption suspension permitted by the SEC. Investors lost access
to their funds in the account and didn’t get the majority of their money back until one month later. The
last payment was settled in 2014, six years after the initial suspension. In terms of the loss of liquidity,
“receiving nothing" is not quite an overstatement.
14Similar logics apply to circuit breaker in the stock market, where investors will crow into selling a stock
if they anticipate the trading will soon be suspended, expediting the price fall. This can also be used to
analyze the effects of liquidity fees and gates, which may exacerbate the self-fulfilling runs.
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ent redemption regimes before and after a critical mass of redemption is demanded. All
redemption requests received before a certain time point will be paid the same amount
per share. If the total redemption in period 1 is not large enough to distabilize the stable
NAV regime, then each investor demanding redemption will receive $1 dollar per share
in period 1, while the rest will receive the pro rata value of realized return of remaining
assets in a remote, indefinite period, heavily discounted, which greatly lowers the resale
price. The strategic complementarity exists because an investor will be more willing to
request redemption if s/he expects more other investors will do the same. The coordi-
nation failure leads to a “bad", self-fulfilling equilibrium, if the interruption of projects is
costly enough (low liquidation value in period 1).
3.3.3 Equivalence between MMF Shares and Bank Deposits
3.3.3.1 Demand deposits
The demand deposit is contracted the following way: Each demand deposit contract has
a face value of one unit of fiat money. Depositors are free to choose whether to demand
early withdrawal in period 1 (early withdrawers), or wait until period 2 (late withdraw-
ers). Bankers promise to pay R1 per dollar deposited to early withdrawers, and R

2 to late
withdrawers, where R2 > R1 > 1. Specifically, the payment consists of two parts: inter-
est payment (short-term r1 and long-term r

2) and principal (par value of the deposit, one




2 = 1+ r






R2 = c2 , the demand deposit delivers the first-best allocation in an incentive-compatible
way.
But due to maturity mismatch and liquidation loss, bankers cannot fully honor their
promises should all depositors demand early withdrawal. The actual payoffs, R˜1 and R˜2,
respectively, are dependent on w the number of early withdrawers in period 1, and wi the
the number of early withdrawers in line before early withdrawer i in period 1.
If w < 1/R1 , the status quo can be maintained by only liquidating some of the bank’s
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If w  1/R1 , the status quo cannot be maintained since the withdrawal demand
exceeds the market value of bank assets in period 1. A depositor i will get
R˜(w,wi) =
8>><>>:
R1 (early withdrawal, wi < 1/R

1)
0 (withdrawal, wi  1/R1)
The payoff structure characterizes the sequential service constraint on the financiers’
side. The fulfillment of withdrawal requests is on a first-come-first-served basis 15.
A threshold wˆ is the number of early withdrawers which will make a patient depos-
itor indifferent between demanding early withdrawal and waiting:
(1  wˆR1)Ys
1  wˆ = R





As analyzed in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the good equilibrium can be achieved








2 . In the socially optimal equilibrium, only
impatient depositors will withdraw money in period 1, and all patient depositors will
wait until period 2.
Yet there is a strategic complementarity in demanding early withdrawals. The strate-
gic complementarity leads to multiple equilibria, including a bad equilibrium, namely
a self-fulfilling bank run. Expecting other people’s early withdrawal will induce a de-
15A variation incorporates suspension of convertibility and liquidation, where the depositors will line up
before the bank opens and the financier will count the number first. It then will decide whether to open
business (when w < yj/r1) or to declare bankruptcy, liquidate its assets, and allocate the proceeds pro
rata to all depositors (when w  yj/r1). This is more like the case of MMF, where same-day redemption
requests are treated equally together after the market closes.
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positor to do the same thing. All depositors will withdraw money in period 1 for fear
that other people will do the same and nothing would be left in period 2. Even without
the inefficiency of excessive risk taking, traditional banks are plagued by runs. Keeping
excessive but still fractional reserves to satisfy liquidity needs will not work in times of
crisis, and is extremely costly in good times.
In a world with safe projects, only self-fulfilling runs exist. Deposit insurance, which
guarantees a payment c1 to each early withdrawer, can remedy the case, without having
to pay out anything or incurring moral hazard problem. The insured demand deposit
contract achieves first-best allocation.
The timeline is the following: In period 0, firms acquire funding from financial inter-
mediaries to pay for capital and labor provided by households, who demand fiat money
(“hoarder"), bank deposits (“depositor"), or shadow bank shares (“investor"). Fiat money
is used as unit of account of consumption goods.
In period 1, households find out their preference types. Impatient households will
withdraw deposits, redeem shares or use fiat money to buy consumption goods right
away, while patient ones will decide whether to do the same or wait until next period.
The financiers will decide how many projects to liquidate in order to satisfy withdrawal
or redemption requests and whether the status quo (full debt repayment or stable NAV)
can be maintained. If so, enter into period 2. If not, then the financiers will have to
declare bankruptcy/breaking the buck, and liquidate all assets and pay back to the de-
positors/investors in a pro rata manner.
In period 2, the returns of projects that haven’t been liquidated (if any) are realized,




The capital structure of financial institution doesn’t matter in terms of creating liquidity
or achieving socially optimal allocation as long as the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) Households are identical ex ante, (2) No aggregate uncertainty, (3) The fraction of
impatient households are known so optimal dividend policy can be devised, (4) Demand
deposits are protected by insurance, (5) Bankruptcy and liquidation are resolved in a
costless, timely manner, (6) The secondary market is frictionless. Bank debt contract and
fund equity contract are equivalent and trading in the secondary market or directly with
the fund also do not matter.
Suppose a financial intermediary issues both demand deposit contracts and equity
shares contracts. In period 1, if a household is revealed to be impatient, s/he can either
withdraw deposits and receive R1 = c

1 , or request redemption/trade the ex-dividend
share in the secondary market and get back d1 + f or d1 +p. All are equal to c1 . If the
household is patient, then s/he will either wait until period 2 and receive R2 = c2 , or use
the dividend to purchase more shares directly with the fund or in the secondary market
in period 1 and redeem shares in period 2, still getting (1+ d1/f)d2 = (1+ d1/p)d2 = c2 .
Since the payoff structures are the same, households in period 0 would like to pay
identical prices for these contracts. The no-arbitrage condition excludes different pricing
of the contracts.
3.4 A Model with Floating Redemption Price
In this section, I’ll introduce a risky project and show how heterogeneous beliefs and
disagreement on future returns affect the conclusions we have in the previous section.
Suppose the return of the project is risky and its two period return is YH with prob-
ability 1  q (“good state")and YL with probability q (“bad state"). Aggregate uncertainty
has been introduced. Suppose YH > Ys > YL.
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Another risk associated with the risky projects lies in its liquidation value in period 1,
when the potential outside buyers have figured out the state of the world and the project
types but would only like to acquire the superior risky projects at a much deeper discount
(1  d)YL in the bad state. In the good state, the liquidation value of risky projects will be
1, while that of safe projects is 1 in both states.
Suppose an omnipotent social planner can allocate resources across different states. It
aims at smoothing consumption across different types of households and different states
of the world.
Then the social planner’s problem is
max
fcm1,(cp1,cp2g
lU(cm1) + (1  l)U(cp1 + cp2)
subject to the resource constraint
(1  l)cp2 =
8>><>>:
[1  lcm1   (1  l)cp1]Ys safe projects
[1  lcm1   (1  l)cp1][(1  q)YH + qYL] risky projects16















U0(cm1) = [(1  q)YH + qYL]U0(cp2)
cp2 =
1  lcm1
1  l [(1  q)YH + qYL]
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The risky projects are preferred by the omnipotent social planner as long as (1  
q)YH + qYL > Ys. Suppose the inequality above holds. The first-best allocation character-
ized by (1) investment choice type j 2 fs, rg and (2) consumption bundle (cm1, cp1, cp2) is
j = r and (c1 , 0, c

2 ), where
U0(c1 ) = [(1  q)YH + qYL]U0(c2 )
c2 =
1  lc1
1  l [(1  q)YH + qYL]
A constrained social planner can only allocate resources intertemporally and across




(1  q)[lU(cGm1)+ (1 l)U(cGp1+ cGp2)]+ q[lU(cBm1)+ (1 l)U(cBp1+ cBp2)]
subject to the resource constraint
(1  l)cGp2 =
8>><>>:
[1  lcGm1   (1  l)cGp1]Ys safe projects
[1  lcGm1   (1  l)cGp1]YH risky projects
(1  l)cBp2 =
8>><>>:
(1  lcBm1 + (1  l)cBp1)Ys safe projects
(1  lcBm1 + (1  l)cBp1)YL risky projects



























2 . If risky projects are invested, the optimal consumption












Since there are aggregate uncertainties across states, consumption pattern cannot be
fully smoothed. If the state of the world is “good" in period 0, the social planner will
maintain a liquidity reserve 17 is lcGm1 and invest in risky assets. The optimal consumption








If the state is bad in period 0, then the social planner will invest all funding in safe
assets and allocate consumption c1 , 0, c

2 . Again, since the social planner can identify the
types of households, there will be no runs and no excess liquidation.
Suppose the financial intermediaries cannot write a complete contract conditional on
states of the economy. Rather, the financial contracts can only be based on households’
action whether the financier has filed for bankruptcy or liquidation protection.
The new timeline is the following: In period 0, nature draws the state of the econ-
omy, which is not observable. Financiers specify debt or equity contracts to attract fund-
ing from households and choose firm projects to make loans to. In period 1, households’
preference types are revealed as private information. Instead of having a consensus on
17Or by investing in risky assets since their liquidation value is the same as that of safe assets in good
state.
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the underlying value, a fraction q of the patient households will investigate the true con-
ditions of the projects and obtain a signal regarding the future payoffs. Start with the
assumption that they receive an accurate private signal in period 1 about the true state
of the world and corresponding project returns. That is, a fraction q(1  l) households
are fully informed about future payoffs. The rest (1  q)(1  l) of impatient households
will remain uninformed because the cost of acquiring information is prohibitively high
18. In period 2, the state of the economy is known to all and the payoffs of the projects are
realized.
3.4.1 Insured demand deposits
The new demand deposits is the following: Each demand deposit contract has a face
value of one unit of fiat money. Depositors are free to choose whether to demand early
withdrawal in period 1 (early withdrawal), or wait until period 2 (late withdrawal).
Bankers promise to pay R1 per dollar deposited to early withdrawal, and the residual
value R2 to late withdrawal, where R2 > R1 > 1.
The actual payoffs, R˜1 and R˜2, respectively, are dependent on w the number of early
withdrawal in period 1, wi the the number of early withdrawal in line before early with-
drawal i in period 1 and the state of the economy.
When the early withdrawals do not exceed the liquidation value (market price) of





1 w YH (late withdrawal, good state)
1 wR1
1 w YL (late withdrawal, bad state)
18Many retail depositors/investors do not have the time/expertise/energy/awareness to analyze infor-
mation, even when the information is disclosed to the public (such as annual reports). They only pay
attention to extremely salient features of the financial contracts, such as interest rates (not a wide range of
it, but just those advertised by credit card or auto loan companies, such as APY, without knowing the exact
meaning and calculation method) and yields, and whether deposits and shares are readily demandable.
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When the withdrawal demand exceeds the market value of bank assets in period 1,
a depositor i will get
R˜(w,wi;F) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
R1 (early withdrawal, good state, wi < 1/R1)
0 (late withdrawal, good state wi  1/R1)
R1 (early withdrawal, bad state, wi < (1  L)YL/R1)
0 (late withdrawal, bad state wi  (1  L)YL/R1)
Without deposit insurance, the strategic complementarity will be more severe if the
households find out that the bank invests in risky projects due to the potential liquidation
loss.
In a world with insured demand deposits where R1 is insured for all depositors, only
impatient households will demand early withdrawal in the good state, while all patient
households will wait until next period since 1 lR11 l YH > R1.
In the bad state, since 1 lR11 l YL < YL < 1R1, the total amount of depositors demand-
ing early withdrawal will be l + q(1  l) and each will receive R1. Instead of the case
with sequential service constraint, the deposit insurance guarantees that late-consumers
will receive R1 in the second period, and therefore the rest (1  q)(1  l) will wait un-
til period 2 expecting a return that can make them at least as good as demanding early
withdrawal since they cannot distinguish between different states.
By lending q(1  l)R1 to the bank, the central bank helps the bank to avoid liquida-
tion loss, and replaces the informed households to become entitled to the corresponding
payment in period 2. When the state realizes in period 2, the second-period payoff is
RL2 =
1 lR1
1 l YL. The insurance agency will bear the aggregate risk, paying out the differ-
ence (1  l)(R2   RL2 ) so that both the central bank and the uninformed households will
get back R2 per contract. The interest rate earned by the central bank is R2R1   1
By setting R1 = c1 and R2 = c

2 , the insured demand deposit can replicate the
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omnipotent social planner’s allocation.
The only caveat is whether the insurance agency is willing and able to provide the
insurance. The total payout of the insurance agency is n = (1  lR1)(1  q)(YH   YL)
in the bad state, and the profit of the bank in the good state is p = (1  lR1)YH   (1 
l)R2 = (1  lR1)q(YH   YL). Since (1  q)p = qn, the insurance is actuarially feasible.
By charging a premium p in the good state and paying out n in the bad state, the insurance
agency helps deliver the first-best allocation.
One critical implicit assumption is that the insurance agency, public or private, must
be able to inject resources into the economy in the bad state. The insurance agency can
accumulate liquidity reserve through charging premium in good states, but the reserve
may still run short and therefore monetary authority’s intervention is needed. Therefore,
although it acts as a protection for depositors and banks, the insurance agency itself needs
a strong backstop. Only the monetary authority is capable enough to provide liquidity in
times of emergency and act as “lender of last resort".
Given the importance of the financial system and the systemic risk presented by fi-
nancial institutions, the government ultimately will have to step in. This implicit gov-
ernment guarantee or bailout is the root of “too big to fail" headache. To alleviate moral
hazard problem posed by systemically important financial institutions, the government
must continuously monitor their risk-taking behaviors and performance, as well as re-
ducing the magnitude of the threat they pose to the whole economy. These are exactly
why the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) is created in the wake of the 2007-
09 financial crisis.
3.4.2 Secondary market trading
In a world with uninsured equity shares, since the fund cannot anticipate the waves of
optimism and pessimism and cannot observe q in advance, the dividend is contracted the
following way: a dividend d1 per share distributed in period 1, and a residual dividend
79
d2 distributed in period 2 with its value depending on the state of the economy.
Denote p the equilibrium price at which impatient households sell their claims in
period 1.The informed patient households know the future dividend is dG2 = (1  d1)YH
in good state and dB2 = (1  d1)YL in bad state.
When the true state is good, the informed patient householdswill act the sameway as
the uninformed ones, and the market clearing condition is lpG = (1  l)d1, pG = 1 ll d1.
The early consumer (impatient households) receive cG1 = d1 + p
G = d1/l, while the late







When the true state is bad, the informed households will sell the shares. The market-
clearing condition becomes [l+ q(1  l)]pB = (1  q)(1  l)d1, or pB = (1 q)(1 l)l+q(1 l) d1 <
1 l
l d1. This is because each household owns a share, and if s/he receives a signal pes-
simistic enough, then there will be more supply than demand, driving down the price.
The consumption of early consumers (impatient and informed patient investors) in






1 . The pessimism of some patient
investors will have a contagious effect through share price, and the pecuniary externality
reduces impatient investors’ welfare.
In terms of the consumption of late consumers (uninformed patient buyers) in period







19, which is smaller than the consumption in
period 1. The dispersion of beliefs potentially drives down the price of shares exchanged
in period 1, enabling uninformed patient investors to purchase more shares, but still con-
sume less than the informed investors.
19Note that the informed patient households will sell their claims in bad state only if
1  d1

















The informed investors’ driving down the price in bad state has two pecuniary ex-
ternalities: (1) the impatient investors consume less than when q = 0; (2) the uninformed
patient investors consume more than when q = 0. These are good spillovers because
they improve risk-sharing between preference types under a fixed dividend policy. The
interest of informed investors is aligned with the social welfare since they themselves are
better off during the process.
The allocation determined in the secondary market involves no run risk and no liq-
uidation loss. But as long as there are sophisticated investors with information about the






2 , 8d1. In other
words, there doesn’t exist a dividend policy which can achieve the first-best allocation.
And since investment projects are chosen in period 0, when the state of economy is
not observable, the secondary market cannot achieve constrained second-best, either.
Most importantly, the secondary market will disappear if insured bank deposits are
introduced. Unsophisticated investors, having anticipated that they will be taken advan-
tage of in the bad state, will choose to deposit their funding in the banks. Sophisticated
investors will only participate in the markets if heterogeneous beliefs/disagreement is
assumed.
3.4.3 Stable NAV
As a response to the defects of secondary market trading, the shadow bank can intervene
and eliminate the pecuniary externalities by participating in the trading.
Suppose the shadow bank offers a fixed price f for equity share purchase and re-
demption in period 1. Again, the result is that there will be zero trading volume in the
secondary market.
When the true state is good, only the impatient investors will redeem their shares,
while all patient investors will reinvest the dividend and purchase more. The shadow
bank needs to pay out lf while receiving (1   l)d1, which will cancel out with each
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other if f is set at 1 ll d1. Each early consumer (impatient investor) will get c
G
1 = d1 + f







When the true state is bad, the impatient investors and informed patient investors
will sell their shares back to the fund at f, and uninformed patient investors will use the
dividend to buy more shares. The consumption of early consumer (impatient investors
and informed patient investors) will be cB1 = d1 + f, while uninformed patient investors
will use their dividend to buy d1f (1  q)(1  l) shares and have (1+ d1f )(1  q)(1  l)
shares in total. Note that the number of newly purchased shares is smaller than the num-
ber of redeemed shares l + q(1   l) because the market price is fixed by the shadow
bank.
The net inflow of shares is
l+ q(1  l)  d1
f
(1  q)(1  l) = l+ [q   d1
f
(1  q)](1  l)
The net redemption value is therefore
(l+ [q   d1
f
(1  q)](1  l))f = [l+ q(1  l)]f  (1  q)(1  l)d1
Given l, q, the shadow bank issuing uninsured equity shares would like to choose
d1 and f to minimize the net redemption value (i.e., net outflow of cash, which requires
assets liquidation), which means a high first-period dividend d1 and a low price f. The
lowest feasible value of f is exactly one unit fiat money, since a price higher than one will
not minimize the net redemption value, while a price lower than one will make house-
holds unwilling to purchase shares in period 0.





A feasible d1 requires
l+q(1 l)
(1 q)(1 l) < 1, or l + q(1   l) < 0.5. In other words, at
least half of the investors should be uninformed and patient to sustain the result. This
parameter restriction corresponds to the retail money market fund, where investors are
natural persons who seek prudent investments and largely overlap with the clientele of
commercial banks.
The f and d1 achieve market-clearing in the primary market directly operated by
the shadow bank. Without relying on liquidity support, the stable NAV helps the shadow
bank to avoid liquidating assets, which is vital to surviving adverse economic conditions.
Therefore in the bad state, the early consumers (impatient investors and informed
patient investors) will consume cB1 = d

1 + f =, while the late consumers (uninformed pa-






(1 q)(1 l)(1  d1)YL = 1 2l 2q(1 l)(1 q)2(1 l)2 YL.
Note that under the optimal dividend policy and stable NAV, the shadow bank needs
to pay out l while receiving (1 q)l+q1 q = l+
q
1 q > l
20 in the good state. The net value
q
1 q will be stored and redistributed to all remaining shareholders in period 2.


















1 q . The fixed purchase and redemption
price avoid liquidation in the bad state, but doesn’t help with risk-sharing in the good
state.
Let’s look back and check whether the uninformed investors will demand early re-
demption under the fixed NAV through amortized cost method. On book, the total value
of the remaining assets in period 2 is changed from (1  d1)YH to (1  d1)YL, probably
through writing down assets, since the state of the economy is know. But should liqui-
20Anegative net redemption value, or a positive net new purchase value in period 1, is often not desirable
either. This is because the projects have to be invested in period 0 to generate productive income. When
more capital is contributed to the open-ended shadow bank, effectively all shares are diluted. This type of
dividend policy might not have been approved by the shareholder in period 0, who were identical ex ante.
But in this case, the probability of being patient is large enough (over 50%), and it is the patient investors,
informed or uninformed, who are the only remaining shareholders of the shadow bank. Therefore the
“dilution" is more like a stock split, which will not affect the actual value received.
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dation occur, the market value will further drop to (1  d1)(1  d)YL, while d captures
the liquidation loss. With a fixed NAV other than f, in order to pay for the net redemp-
tion, the shadow bank, which has no liquidity backstop, has to resort to asset liquidation,
which will lead to a downward spiral of asset values. Therefore a fixed NAV at f = 1
is the best available tool to reduce net redemption in bad state to zero and avoid asset
liquidation.
The amortized-cost net asset value of the shadow bank share in period 1 will be
NAVAC = (1  d1)YL, which will be greater than or equal to one if YL  11 d1 . The mark-
to-market net asset value of the shadow bank share after the liquidation in period 1 will
be
NAVMM = [1  d1   Net redemption value(1  d)YL ](1  d)YL
Clearly, in an adverse market environment where the shadow banks desire liquid-
ity the most, NAVAC > NAVMM. With the shadow bank itself propping up the price,
there will not be information extraction as long as the net asset value is maintained. The
uninformed will not panic, and the optimistic will buy the shares at the constant price.
The main difference between traditional banks and MMFs at maintaining a stable
price of the contracts lies in the source of liquidity to satisfy the unanticipated early with-
drawal/redemption due to mood swings on uncertainties. Traditional banks rely on liq-
uidity backstop provided by deposit insurance and federal reserve at the lender of last
resort, which is more efficient and cost-effective in coping with aggregate uncertainties
since the central bank controls the money supply. Shadow banks, on the other hand, have
to depend on selling assets, often at a discount, to maintain a stable price.
As long as the fraction of patient households receiving negative signals (and there-
fore requesting redemption) is not very large, the uncertainties regarding future payoff
will have no effect on the share price. However, if the fraction is large, more early re-
demption than l will either result in interrupting ongoing projects or induce the MMF to
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hold more cash reserves. And since the signal is randomly drawn, it is hard to predict the
fraction. The only way to make sure is to hold 100% cash reserve, which is the same as
the storage and worse than the autarky state (where at least patient households enjoy R
units of goods.) Otherwise the large redemption will make it profitable for the rest of the
patient household to run as well, making it impossible to sustain the direct redemption
and fixed price/NAV regime. The solutions are (1) do not allow direct redemption and
let the secondary market work, such as the ETFs; (2) allow direct redemption but with
floating NAV to reflect the fair market price; and (3) allow direct redemption and stable
NAV only if the liquidation loss is very little.
3.4.4 Amortized-cost vs. Mark-to-market accounting
In this model, since the projects either succeed or fail, the bankruptcy regions for tra-
ditional and shadow bankers are the same if they make it to period 2: when the project
fails, traditional banker cannot fulfill debt payment, and shadow banker have to liquidate
their fund (where nothing remains) An extension allows for more possibilities of invest-
ment return/asset price fluctuations, and the shadow banks with no capital buffer will
be much more fragile than traditional banks with adequate capital buffer. But if tradi-
tional banks are also penniless (infinite leverage), then their fates are the same.. When
the project succeeds, traditional bankers will get the residual value, while money market
fund managers achieve high return for their investors, keep them in the fund, and earn
the management fees 21 so that they get residual value rather than a flat-rate fee to remove
21Here, the accounting method matters. By using the amortized cost method, the MMFs are able to keep
the NAV stable at $1 per share, while the future expected return from money market debt instruments
are linearly distributed as dividends to each share. That is, the MMF pre-allocate the future expected re-
turns, exposing investors who remain in the fund to default or price fluctuation risks. When the underlying
investment project is risk-less, then the risk sharing mechanisms of traditional and shadow banks are iden-
tical. First-best allocation is achieved in the good equilibrium, and deposit insurance should be put in place
to eliminate the bad bank run equilibrium. But when we allow for risky investments and agency problem
of bankers, the bankers will take on excessive risk to earn more residual value (in expectation) for tradi-
tional bankers and to offer high yields and earn more management fees for shadow bankers. Therefore
depositors or investors who choose to wait will be exposed to larger risks, and the risk-sharing feature of
these contracts no longer works. Moreover, if households can distinguish between safe and risky projects,
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excessive risk-taking incentives if they want to keep stable NAV like bank deposits and
provide insurance (whenmarket discipline is costly or there are many unsophisticated in-
vestors), or float the NAV to restore market discipline by inducing liquidity-demanding,
tail-risk-ignoring (due to inability to distinguish between safe and risky assets) investors
to government fund and sophisticated remain in prime fund (better to have a separat-
ing equilibrium because in the pooling case, the sophisticated is taking advantage of the
naive ones by redeeming shares earlier.)
If the banker chooses to be funded solely by equity, when liquidated, shareholders
will be paid first, the same seniority as debt holders when the capital structure is a mixed
one. Under the amortized cost accounting method, the net asset value is kept stable at $1
per share, making the equity share value as constant as debt. The redemption, similar to
deposit withdrawals, requires no fees and is subject to the sequential service constraint.
Therefore the MMF shares are essentially the same as the demand deposits, although the
former is considered as a type of securities and therefore circumvents the capital require-
ment regulation.
To maintain the contract, MMF managers must ensure a market where the equity
shares can be redeemed in period 1, so that impatient households are able to consume
goods. The redemption value of each share should not fall below the original purchase
price, otherwise households will find the storage more favorable.
Therefore the market in period 1 should satisfy the following conditions:
(1) Equilibrium quantity redeemed is determined by the supply side of the shares,
i.e., shareholders requesting redemption;
(2) The demand curve is perfectly elastic, therefore the redemption price is a constant
no matter how many shares are redeemed.
or information processing is not costly, market discipline can be restored through the threat of early de-
posit withdrawals or fund redemption. Otherwise, government intervention is needed. For debt contracts,
adding capital buffer (capital requirement) to remove excessive risk-taking incentives and providing de-
posit insurance to eliminate self-fulfilling runs. For equity contracts, adding another capital buffer with
less seniority from the management (similar to hedge funds)
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This type of secondary market may often not be readily available. But without the
market of redemption, no households would purchase fund shares in period 0. Therefore
the fund managers will operate the market and allows redemption so that liquidity is
provided.
3.5 Conclusions
This paper models money creation by both traditonal and shadow banks and explores
optimal regulatory responses. Shadow banks, while performing similar money creation
functions as traditional banks, are subject to the regulation on securities (mutual fund)
industry rather than the banking industry. Instead of regulated by the central bank and
protected by deposit insurance, shadow banks create money through uninsured equity
shares and frequently disclose information of their Investment portfolios. A special breed
of mutual funds, money market funds are able to do so by investing in liquid money
market instruments with highest ratings and thus maintaining a stable net asset value
through amortized cost accounting, in contrast to the commonly adopted floating NAV
using fair market pricing.
This paper argues that a stable valuation insensitive to market news is critical in
producing means of payment/medium of exchange among uninformed investors. Con-
ditions are derived where the information disclosure requirement is equivalent to the
classical capital requirement, and where they differ. The regulatory arbitrage weakens
the effectiveness of monetary policy, and the private money creation exceeds its socially
optimal level. The anticipation of pecuniary externalities due to fire sale and overlap-
ping asset classes through diversification reinforces the run incentives, exacerbating the
instability and falling apart of the shadow banking intermediation. Moreover, the accu-
mulation of systemic risk through guarantee and sponsorship links the traditional and
shadow banking system, calling for macro-prudential regulation and a central regulator.
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A.1 Interbank Market
In the inter-bank market, there will only be one direction of loans, namely that from pa-
tient f -banks to impatient s-banks 1.
Lemma 10. There exists an interest rate r f s in the inter-bank market at which f -banks without
early redemption requests in period 1 are willing to lend to s-banks with early redemption requests.
Proof. In period 1, the s-bank facing early redemption (the borrowing bank) will borrow
against its asset from the f-bank without early redemption request (the lending bank).
The lending bank will sell its safe asset to outside buyers at the price of one, and lend the
money to the borrowing bank so as to pay to the impatient household. Thus the s-bank is
able to keep the control rights of the assets.
In period 2, the payoff of superior risky asset realizes, and the borrowing bank need
to pay backmoney to the lending bank, which needs tomake payments to the f-household.
The borrowing bankwill receive (1 c)Rs when the project succeeds and (1 c)Ra when
the project fails. The lending bank will receive r f s when the project succeeds and Ra when
the project fails. The patient household will receive rˆ2s when the project succeeds and Ra
when the project fails.
The participation constraint of the borrowing bank is
(1  q)[(1  c)Rs   r f s] > 0
namely
r f s < (1  c)Rs
1 There are four possible inter-bank loan rates, rjj0 if a j-bank lends to a j0-bank, where j, j0 2 fs, f g, but
only r f s is feasible. Since rsj0 = (1  cl)Rs and r f j0 = R f for j0 2 fs, f g, a patient bank will male zero profits
lending to an impatient bank of the same type. And because rs f = (1  cl)Rs is not affordable to f -banks,
impatient safe banks will always choose to liquidate own assets.
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The participation constraint of the lending bank is
(1  q)(r f s   rˆ2s ) > R f   1
namely
r f s > rˆ2s +
R f   1
1  q
There exists such r f s if
(1  c)Rs > rˆ2s +
R f   1
1  q
c < 1  R f   q(1  c)Ra
(1  q)Rs
which holds for all c < c.
Indeed, the inter-bank market works through the r f s.
In the inter-bankmarket, s-banks with early redemption demandwill borrow from f -
banks with patient households against the superior risky projects in period 1. Essentially,
it is as if all impatient households hold safe claims and only safe projects will be liquidated
in period 1.
A.2 Enhanced Capital Requirement
Effective shadow bank regulation requires a higher capital requirement than traditional
banks. Thus all banks participate in traditional banking (low-cost burdened by high-cost),
or create a shadow-shadow banking sector.
If shadow bank regulation is loose than traditional bank regulation, not effective and
regulatory arbitrage.
Suppose the regulator expands traditional regulation on safe claims to risky claims.
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Since I assume the investment is made after the funding is raised 2, the regulator is
unable to restrict the investment to safe and superior risky assets as a prerequisite for
banks.
Cases are rare when the projects are invested before the funding is raised. And even if
the case is true, financial intermediaries may still be able to adjust their portfolios before
maturity. So it is reasonable to assume that the regulator can only impose regulation
either before the funding is raised or after the projects are invested. This assumption
captures the lag of regulation intervention by the regulator in response to financial market
activities, even when the regulation rules are specified ex ante.
the possibility of ex ante prohibition in investing in inferior risky projects is excluded
because I assume that the government can only acquire information after the projects are
invested. That is, it cannot review the information and approve the projects before they
are invested. The intervention is afterwards.
Instead, the regulator can base the regulation on the type of financial claims issued.
Assumption 11 (Limited information-processing capability). When all banks disclose infor-
mation regarding underlying assets, the regulator can distinguish between safe and risky assets,
but can only identify the true types of a fraction h of banks holding risky assets.
The information set of the regulator is a hybrid version of the banks’ and the house-
holds’, and h measures informativeness of the regulator. When h = 1, the regulator is
informed sine it can identify between superior and inferior risky assets, and uninformed
when h = 0.
When the regulator can only identify the types of h banks, no impact on superior
risky assets, but banks may have an opportunitistic mindset and may try their luck by
investing in inferior risky projects.
A capital requirement ensuring “skin in the game" can reduce or even eliminate the
excessive risk taking incentives. The banks are able to keep their capital where the state
2The case where the investment is made before the funding is raised is analyzed in Appendix.
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is good and financial obligations are met. When the state is bad, the creditors get paid
before the shareholders and the capital is seized to compensate for the loss of creditors.
Lemma 12. Given capital requirement k and interest rate r jˆ (j = s, f ), banks which issue type-jˆ
claims will
1. prefer type- f over type-i assets if k > r jˆ  
R f (1 q)Ri
q ;
2. prefer type-s over type- f assets if low-cost and prefer type- f over type-s assets if high-cost
and k > r jˆ  
R f (1 q)(1 c)Rs
q ;
3. prefer type-s assets to type-i if c < cˆ or if c > cˆ and k > r jˆ   (1  c)Ra
Proof. (1) Given the interest rate r jˆ, banks which issue type- jˆ claims will invest in type- f
rather than type-s if the capital requirement k satisfies:
(1  q)[(1  c)Rs + k   r jˆ] + qmax([(1  c)Ra + k   r jˆ], 0) < R f + k   r jˆ
when k < r jˆ   (1  c)Ra, the inequality is equivalent to:
k > r jˆ  
R f   (1  q)(1  c)Rs
q
which is larger than r jˆ   (1  c)Ra for low-cost banks, contradiction.
when k > r jˆ   (1  c)Ra, the inequality is equivalent to:
(1  c)[(1  q)Rs + qRa] < R f
which does not hold for low-cost banks, contradiction.
Thus the condition will never hold for low-cost banks, but for high-cost banks, the




(2) Given the type- jˆ (j = s, f ) claims, banks which issue type- jˆ claims will invest in
type- f rather than type-i if the capital k satisfies:
R f + k   r jˆ > (1  q)[Ri + k   r jˆ]+qmax[(k r jˆ),0]
when k < r jˆ,
k > r jˆ  
R f   (1  q)Ri
q| {z }
>0
when k > r jˆ, the inequality is equivalent to
(1  q)Ri < R f
which holds all the time.
(3) Given the interest rate r jˆ, banks which issue type- jˆ claims will invest in type-s
rather than type-i if the capital requirement k satisfies:
(1  q)[(1 c)Rs+ k  r jˆ]+ qmax([(1 c)Ra+ k  r jˆ], 0) > (1  q)[Ri+ k  r jˆ]+ qmax([k  r jˆ], 0)
if k < r jˆ   (1  c)Ra, the inequality is equivalent to:
(1  c)Rs > Ri
which holds for c < cˆ.
if r jˆ   (1  c)Ra < k < r jˆ, the inequality is equivalent to:
k > r jˆ  
(1  c)[(1  q)Rs + qRa]  (1  q)Ri
q
which is smaller than r jˆ   (1  c)Ra and is not binding.
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if k > r jˆ, the inequality is equivalent to:
(1  c)[(1  q)Rs + qRa] > (1  q)Ri
which holds all the time for all banks if assume (1  c)[(1  q)Rs + qRa] > 1.
when k > r jˆ   (1  c)Ra, the inequality is equivalent to:
(1  c)[(1  q)Rs + qRa] < R f
which does not hold for low-cost banks, contradiction.
Thus the condition will never hold for low-cost banks, but for high-cost banks, the
condition is equivalent to k > r jˆ  
R f (1 q)(1 c)Rs
q .
Direct revelation mechanism can be achieved by setting capital requirements k  kTB
on traditional banks and k  kSB and shadow banks, where
kTB = rTB  
R f   (1  q)Ri
q
, kSB = rSB  
R f   (1  q)Ri
q
Note that low-cost banks with c < cˆ will always invest in superior risky assets.
That is, the capital requirement cannot prevent banks from financing superior risky assets
through safe claims.
In order for the deposit insurance or implicit guarantee not being abused, need to
require kTB > rTB   q(1  cl)Ra. To ensure the financial claims are indeed safe from the
perspectives of households, the capital requirement should be able to deliver full payment
even when the underlying projects fail, namely k > rTB   (1  cl)Ra, which is satisfied
by kTB.
The capital requirement in shadow banking sector plays a dual role: it prevents ex-
cessive risk-taking of low-cost banks when cl > cˆ, as well as preventing regulatory arbi-
trage by inferior risky assets. But when cl > cˆ, low-cost banks always prefer the superior
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risky projects, and the high capital requirement in shadow banking only serves to prevent
regulatory arbitrage, which creates a barrier to entry for innovative low-cost banks when
banks’ capital is scarce.
When k > kSB, high-cost banks prefer safe assets over risky ones and will operate
in traditional banking. Low-cost banks, however, will also operate in traditional banking
for the lower interest rate.
In equilibrium, all bank participate in traditional banking. The interest rate is not
changed and the first-best is achieved under the capital requirement, which prevents
high-cost banks from excessive risk-taking while helping stabilize the interest rate when
low-cost banks invest in superior risky assets.
When k < kSB, banks will not be able to participate in shadow banking, which is not
a binding constraint since no banks will raise funding in the regulated shadow banking.
In the traditional banking sector, high-cost banks will invest in safe assets and low-cost
banks will still innovate and invest in superior risky assets.
When k < kTB, banks will not be able to participate in traditional banking. Beneficial
innovation is sacrificed for preventing excessive risk taking, and all wealth are stored.
Condition 13 (No-regulatory-arbitrage condition). To prevent regulatory arbitrage, the capi-
tal requirement in the shadow banking sector should not be less than that in the traditional banking
sector:
kSB  kTB
Otherwise, banks will choose to issue risky claims and we’re back to laissez-faire
banking.
By requiring a risk-based capital requirement k = r jˆ  
R f (1 q)Ri
q , banks issuing jˆ-
claims will only invest in safe assets.
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B.1 Model with a Wealthy Depositor
Suppose there is a wealthy depositor endowed withW > 1 units of wealth in period 0.
Particularly, I assume the wealthy depositor will receive an income of I in period
1. This allows for additional liquidity which can be used to support banks facing runs of
common depositors. In this sense, the wealthy depositor plays the role similar to a central
bank as “lender of last resort". The benchmark case where the wealthy depositor has un-
constrained income gives us the usual result as in the social planners case. However, the
focus here is onwhether themarket itself could survive panics without relying on govern-
ment backstop. This is emphasized later when I add constraints on liquidity/capital held
by the wealthy depositor in period 1 to accentuate the difference. Normally, the state is
assumed to have exuberant power in terms of providing liquidity through various mon-
etary and fiscal policies, but not the private market.
The wealthy depositors, however, are always patient and risk-neutral (or use convex
utility function), indifferent between consumption in period 1 and in period 2. Rather
than risk-sharing, the wealthy depositor uses demand-deposit contract as monitoring de-
vice.
Wealthy depositors have incentives to deviate since awh > c. If the project is bad,
running on the bank is the weakly dominant strategy. If the funding from the wealthy
depositor is large enough, then this will exert monitoring effort on the bank and lead to
effective market discipline. The uninformed depositors are simply free-riders. If they can
observe the wealthy depositor’s withdrawal behavior, then it is equivalent to the case
where the private signal is made public. The signal becomes noisy if the uninformed
depositors cannot tell whether the wealthy depositor withdraws due to bad signal or its
own liquidity preference.
If the project is good, then the strategy depends onwhether the wealth is constrained:
if other uninformed depositors choose to run, the wealthy depositor will stay in the bank
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as long as the run does not threat the solvency of the bank. Moreover, it will lend more to
the bank to satisfy the liquidity needs. Alternatively, it will buy the deposit contracts from
panicked uninformed depositors. In this sense, the wealthy depositor has an anchoring
effect in the bank’s funding structure.
However, if the funding from the wealthy depositor is relatively small, then there is
a strategic complementarity among informed and uninformed depositors: the wealthy
depositors may run even when the private signal is good, since the potential run from
uninformed depositors will threaten the solvency of the bank due to fire sale discounts.
In this case, the wealthy depositors will not acquire private information to begin with.
All depositors are uninformed; no market discipline, and the banking system is not vi-
able if there is no regulation such as capital requirement to curb the excessive risk-taking
incentives.
B.2 Model with Separated Contracts
In this section I examine the possibility of the bank offering two separate contracts to
common and wealthy depositors, namely different rates for retail and wholesale funding.
In themodel, there are two types of creditors: retail depositors andwholesale lenders.
Banks can choose from two investment portfolios different in risk levels, and there is a
fixed cost to monitor banks.
The wholesale lender has more money to lend and is more financially sophisticated,
which brings in two effects, depending on the overall economic situation. In good times,
the wholesale lender is not liquidity-constrained and can meet the borrowing demand
from the bank, obtaining the portfolio as collateral. Even if when all retail depositors run
on the bank, the bank can always fill in the liquidity gap by borrowing from the wholesale
lender, which disincentivizes the retail depositors from bank runs to begin with. This is
the anchor effect, which increases the stability of the bank.
In bad times, however, the bank’s portfolio worth less due to price fall of assets, and
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the wholesale lender may not be willing to roll over the debt (or “flight to quality"). In
this case, the bank has to liquidate some assets in the portfolio in order to pay back the
debts, which may exacerbate the fire sale problem. Retail depositors will also join the
force and demand early withdrawal. In the end, the whole portfolio is liquidated, the
bank goes bankrupt, and the fire sale problem is even more severe in the market, which
would result in more bank failures.
When deposit insurance is put in place and all retail depositors are fully insured,
market discipline incentive will not be reduced because these depositors wouldn’t exert
efforts to monitor the bank even when not protected by the insurance. The major benefit
of deposit insurance is less assets liquidation needed in bad times, therefore alleviating
the fire sale problem. The cost, however, is the loss that will be incurred to the insurance
fund if the bank still fails.
When the deposit insurance limit is increased to cover all wholesale debts, then mar-
ket discipline incentive will be eliminated, and the insurance fund faces an even larger
payout when the bank fails. The benefit, nevertheless, is that the bank’s ability to roll over
its debt no longer depends on the marked-to-market value of the collateral it can provide.
In other words, the bank remains immune to the financial contagion through fire sale of
assets by other institutions.
If they choose to wait until the last period when the assets mature, namely, they agree
to rollover the one-period debt contract with the bank, then they will get r2DD and r
2
UU,
respectively, if the project succeeds, and get 0 otherwise. If the households choose not to
rollover the debt, then the bank can avoid liquidating assets by borrowing more from the
wholesale lender, if the wholesale borrowing rate is low enough.
The timeline is the following:
1. In period 0, retail depositors enter into the demand deposit contract and the whole-
sale lender negotiates a one-period debt contract with the bank. The banker will
choose one portfolio and invest A = D + U + E   R while holding R amount of
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reserves. The choice of portfolio will not be revealed to both types of creditors,
but they can choose whether to exert efforts to discover the truth, which takes one
period to work.
2. In period 1, wholesale lender will decide whether to rollover the debt and retail
depositors will decide whether to demand early withdrawal. If they have exerted
monitoring efforts, then they will know which portfolio the bank has chosen and
invested in. The bank will liquidate some or all of its assets in the portfolio at the
market price to meet the liquidity demand, if any.
3. In period 2, the remaining assets (if any) in the portfolio mature. If the underlying
projects are successful, then the debt contracts are fulfilled and the banker gets the
residual value as profits. If not, then the banker gets nothing, and the reserve will
be split among creditors according to some predetermined rules (e.g., seniority).
Run region. Given the bank’s choice of portfolio,
(1) if the wholesale lender agrees to roll over the debt and retail depositors do not
demand early withdrawal, the expected utility of the wholesale lender is pHu(rU2U) +
(1   pH)u(lUR), and the expected utility of the retail depositors is pHu(rD2D) + (1  
pH)u(lDR).
(2) if the retail depositors all demand early withdrawal and the wholesale lender
agrees to lend more to meet the liquidity needs, then each depositor gets rD1D while the
expected utility of the wholesale lender is pHu(rU2U + rU1rD1D) + (1  pH)u(R).
(3) if the wholesale lender declines to rollover the debt while the retail depositors
do not demand early withdrawal, then the bank has to liquidate some assets in order to
meet the liquidity assets, (1  d)L = rU1U, and has A  L remaining assets. The expected
utility of depositors is pHu(rD2D) + (1  pH)u(R) if the remaining assets satisfies rH(A 
L) + R > rD2D. If rH(A   L) + R < rD2D, then the expected utility of depositors is
pHu(rH(A  L) + R) + (1  pH)u(R).
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(4) if both types of creditors decide to quit in period 1, then all assets are liquidated.
The total value of the bank is (1  d)A+ R, which is allocated between creditors and the
banker. The banker’s equity can be wiped out if d is large enough. Suppose (1  d)A+
R > rU1U + rD1D.
Given the wholesale lender agrees to roll over the debt, the retail depositors will run
if u(rD1D) > pHu(rD2D) + (1  pH)u(lDR).
Given the wholesale lender declines to roll over the debt and rH(A  L) + R > rD2D,
the retail depositors will run if u(rD1D) > pHu(rD2D) + (1  pH)u(R). That is, if U is
small enough, the run region of retail depositors is larger if the wholesale lender doesn’t
run. This is because wholesale funding and retail funding are competing for the reserves
when the investment portfolio fails if both decide to wait until the last period.
Given the wholesale lender declines to roll over the debt and rH(A  L) + R < rD2D,
the retail depositors will run if u(rD1)D > pHu(rH(A  L) + R) + (1  pH)u(R). That is,
if U is large enough, the run region of retail depositors is smaller if the wholesale lender
doesn’t run. This is because the liquidity demanded by wholesale funding in period 1 is
so large that long-term investment will be deteriorated to a large extent. Therefore the
wholesale funding can stabilize retail funding when it doesn’t run, and will distabilize
retail funding when it runs.
Given the retail depositors do not demand early withdrawal, the wholesale lender
will decline to roll over the debt if u(rU1U) > pHu(rU2U) + (1  pH)u(lUR).
Given the retail depositors demand early withdrawal, the wholesale lender will de-
cline to roll over the debt if u(rU1U) > pHu(rU2U + rU1rD1D) + (1  pH)u(R) and (1 
d)A+ R > rU1U + rD1D.
The run region of wholesale lender will be larger if the retail depositors don’t run.
This is because when the retail depositors don’t run, they will be competing for the re-
serve, and the wholesale lender will lose the opportunity to lend more to the bank and
potentially get higher expected utility.
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Bank runs. In addition, suppose there is a systemic risk with probability s at time
1. Then the bank has to liquidate some of its assets in order to pay the creditors 1. Put
differently, the bank is no longer able to rollover its short-term debt.
In normal times, the wholesale lender is not liquidity constrained, therefore will
agree to extend the lending if the less risky portfolio is chosen. In times of crisis, however,
liquidity in the financial market evaporates, and the wholesale lender will also decide not
to rollover the debt.
Therefore in normal times, the wholesale lender acts like an anchor lender which
boosts small creditors’ confidence in the bank and enhances stability. However, when
there is a liquidity shock, the wholesale lender will stop lending and become a financial
distabilizer, since it will induce small depositors to stop rolling over the debt.
In normal times (with probability of 1  s), other lenders’ decision depends onwhole-
sale lender’s decision. The wholesale lender will roll over the debt only if it finds out the
bank has chosen the less risky portfolio. Therefore the bank will choose the less risky
portfolio. In times of crisis (with probability of s), the wholesale lender will not roll over
the debt and require the bank to fulfill the payment of rU1U, and retail depositors will
also demand early withdrawal of rD1D. All assets have to be liquidated at a low fire
sale price (or high discount rate when used as collateral to get new funding), and since
[1  d(A)]A < rD1D+ rU1U, the banker’s equity is wiped out and losses are incurred to
creditors.
The banker’s expected utility is
(1  s)pLu(rLA  rU2U   rD2D) (B.2.1)
1It could be the case where the bank’s balance sheet shrinks by the factor d, either through loss from
transactions with the failed systemic institution, or through falling asset price resulting from a portfolio
similar to that held by the failed systemic institution and fire sale price. It could also result from the in-
vestor/creditor side due to evaporated liquidity and flight to quality: the repo or ABCP market freezes and
creditors are no longer willing to rollover their debt. In this paper, the behavior is modeled as creditors
“run" on the bank, and the mechanism is basically the same as that in a model of debt rollover failure.
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(1  s)pLu[rLE+ (rL   rU2)U + (rL   rD2)D] (B.2.2)
which is assumed to be greater than u(E); i.e., the participation constraint is satisfied.
If the bank chooses the more risky portfolio, then even in normal times, debt will not
be rolled over and bank profit is zero.
Banks are good at managing risky financial assets, and there will be social welfare
loss when these assets are liquidated before maturity (financial disintermediation). In
other words, investment technology is available only to bankers, who are financially more
sophisticated. Depositors/creditors only have access to risk-free assets (or storage tech-
nology), of which the return is certain and given.
Full insurance. Now we assume that both types of debts are fully insured. Then
there will be no bank runs and no market discipline. Rather, a higher insurance premium
is charged.
If the banker chooses the less risky portfolio, her expected utility is
pLu[rLA  rU2U   rD2D] (B.2.3)
If the banker chooses the more risky portfolio, her expected utility is
pHu[rH(A  a)  rU2U   rD2D] (B.2.4)
where a punishing insurance premium a is charged on the bank.
The banker will prefer the less risky portfolio if
pLu[rLA  rU2U   rD2D] > pHu[rH(A  a)  rU2U   rD2D] (B.2.5)
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Compared with the case where only deposits are fully insured:
pLu(rLA  rU2U   rD2D) > pH1  su[rH(A  L)  rD2D] 
s
1  s pLu[rL(A  L)  rD2D]
(B.2.6)
The optimum risk premium is pinned down by solving
pHu[rH(A  a)  rU2U  rD2D] = pH1  su[rH(A  L)  rD2D] 
s
1  s pLu[rL(A  L)  rD2D]
(B.2.7)
In this case, market discipline is preserved by charging a punishable insurance pre-
mium on the bank. The social welfare is higher because the investment is not interrupted.
The question is whether the centralized monitoring can work better than decentral-
ized market discipline. It could be yes, since there are high-cost and free-rider problems
with market discipline and even large creditors can shift the risk by purchasing CDS to
avoid costly monitoring. It could be no, since it’s never easy to find the right level of risk
premium, and large centralized agency is always associated with the problem of ineffi-
ciency.
The debate, ultimately, is about the advantages and disadvantages of market and
government, the invisible hand and the visible hand.
It seems that when there is financial friction, prominently in the systemic crisis (fire
sale, pecuniary externality, financial contagion), government intervention and centralized
planning is more relevant and efficient.
B.3 A Deposit Insurance Fund facing Tradeoffs
This model goes back to the setting where there is no excessive risk-taking activities and
no information acquisition regarding the bank assets. The payoff is solely determined
by the state of the nature, and self-fulfilling bank runs coexist with fundamental-driven
bankruptcy.
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Here, the capped deposit insurance is rationalized by a tradeoff between preventing
bank runs and reducing payout costs.
B.3.1 The Environment
We follow the basic settings in the seminal Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In this three-
period model (T = 0, 1, 2), there is a single consumption good, and a continuum of ex ante
homogeneous agents of measure one in this model.
There are two ex post types of agents: impatient and patient. A fraction l 2 (0, 1)
2 of the agents are impatient, which is common knowledge. The probability of being
impatient, conditional on l, is equal and independent for each agent.
Impatient agents only care about their consumption in T = 1 (denoted as cm) and
their utility function is u(cm), while patient agents can consume in both periods, cp1 and
cp2, and only care about the total amount of consumptionwith a utility function of u(cp1+
cp2) 3, where u is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and strictly concave.
The agents have access to an investment technology, which returns R 4 units of output
in T = 2 for each unit of input invested in T = 0 5. The technology also allows the
consumers to get their initial investment when the project is interrupted in T = 1 6.
Now let’s discuss the case where fundamental bank runs are introduced. There is a
positive probability, q, with which the economy will transit from the solvent state to the
insolvent state. And we also need to check that banks are viable, ex ante.
2Here, we assume l is fixed. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) also discussed the case allowing l to be
random (aggregate uncertainty). Later in the extensions part, we will relax this assumption and assume a
random proportion.
3For impatient agents, the time-preference parameter, r, is simply zero. The patient agents have a posi-
tive r, but the magnitude is irrelevant for our current research. Without loss of generality, we assume r = 1
and focus the research on R.
4In Diamond-Dybvig model, they assume the long-run return is risk-free, while in Goldstein-Pauzner
model (2005), the investment project returns R with probability p 2 (0, 1) and returns 0 otherwise.
5Wewill relax the condition and discuss the case where liquidation technology returns smaller than one,
and the case where the fundamentals are so good that the short-run return also improves.
6Therefore, compared to the storage technology, the investment technology is as good if the agent is
impatient, and is strictly better if the agent is patient.
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Now let’s first consider a simple model where there are only two possible states of
the world: H and L, corresponding to RH and RL, respectively.
In state H, the investment project returns RH, while in state L, the investment project
returns RL, and RH > 1 > RL 7. Therefore when R = RL, it is efficient to liquidate the
assets, and both types of agents will run on the banks at t = 1.
The timing of events is the following:
 In period 0, nature draws each agent’s type from independent and identical dis-
tributions. This information, however, is not disclosed to each agent until next pe-
riod. Agents each will receive one unit of endowments andmake investments. Note
that with the costless liquidation technology and a risk-free return larger than one,
agents will invest all of their endowments in projects in this period.
 In period 1, the type of each agent is revealed as a private information. Impatient
agents will interrupt the investment and make consumption. Patient agents will
choose whether to consume now, or wait until next period.
 In period 2, the return of remaining investment, if any, is realized and patient agents
will consume all goods available, if they choose to wait in the previous period.
The sequence of actions is the following: nature moves first and draws the state, H
with probability 1  q and L with probability q. For each realized state, there are three
periods, 0, 1 and 2, the same as the setting in Diamond-Dybvig model. Ex ante homo-
geneous agents make investment decisions in period 0. In period 1, the true state of the
world is revealed, as well as each agent’s type. The former is a common knowledge, while
7We can also introduce risks into the return. One way is to assume that the investment returns RH with a
positive probability of success in H state, and returns RL with the same probability of success in L state. The
probability of success among different states is the same, and can either be a constant or a function of bank’s
monitoring effort. Another way to capture differences between these two states is to assume that given a
certain level of return, the probability of success is higher in H state, which will not make fundamental
difference.
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the latter is a private information. The impatient agents will demand early withdrawal,
while the patient agent chooses whether to wait or run.
In an economy without banks offering demand deposit contract, agents first invest
their endowments in projects at period 0. In period 1, the state of the world is revealed.
If R = RH, the state is solvent, then we’re in the same autarky case as in the Diamond-
Dybvig model. If the return is revealed to be RL < 1, however, then both types of agents
will liquidate their assets.
The social welfare is
W 0autarky = (1  q)[lu(1) + (1  l)u(RH)] + qu(1)
= lu(1) + (1  l) [(1  q)u(RH) + qu(1)]| {z }
E u(R)
(B.3.1)
Here, our focus is on the case when 0 < q < 1 8
The optimal risk sharing problem is
max (1  q)[lu(cm) + (1  l)u(cp2)] + qu(1) (B.3.2)





This is equivalent to maximizing lu(cm) + (1  l)u(cp2). Therefore we have
u0(cm) = RHu0(cp2) (B.3.4)
8When q = 1, the state of the world must be L. Since RL is so low, early liquidation becomes desirable.
When q = 0, we go back to the one-state case in the previous section except for the fact that the return
to investment is RH rather than RDD. Ex ante, the bank can set r1 = cm where u0(cm) = Ru0(cp2) and






B.3.2 Equilibrium with Banks
Denote fi the number of depositors standing in front of depositor i in the line and V the
total number of depositors in the line demanding early withdrawal.
Note that bank run is defined as the case where patient depositors also demand early
withdrawal, i.e., the “bad" equilibrium described in the Diamond-Dybvig model. Note
that the minimum value of V is l, the number of impatient agents. Therefore an implied
constraint on the deposit insurance premium is 1 ar1  l, or a  1  lr1, since the l im-
patient agents will always withdraw money in period T = 1 (otherwise V will always be
in the second case and the insurance fund always needs to pay out money, making banks
not desirable in the first place). This poses an upper bound to the insurance premium.
Note that since impatient agents will always withdraw in T = 1, whether there will
be bank runs depends on whether the patient agents will demand early withdrawal and
if so, how many.
When there are V depositors lining up in front of the bank counter and demanding
earlywithdrawal, the rest of patient agents will compare the return of waiting until period
T = 2 and that of demanding early withdrawal in period T = 1, namely r2 and r1. Note
that r1 is a fixed amount promised in the demand deposit contract, while r2 is the residual
value of banks divided by the number of depositors waiting until the last period.




1 V if V <
1
r1
0 if V  1r1
Clearly, when r1 increases, r2 will decrease. And it is also a decreasing function in V,
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since ¶r2¶V =   (r1 1)R(1 V)2 < 0 and
(1 r1V)R




Note that r2 reaches its largest value, r2 =
(1 lr1)R
1 l when V takes its lowest value of





< 1r1 . Obviously, Vˆ is
not an equilibrium point: if the patient agent believes actual V will be a bit smaller than
Vˆ, and she believes that all other patient agents have the same beliefs, then she will not
demand early withdrawal since waiting until the last period generates a higher return.
Other patient depositors will do the same, and V will equal l, the good equilibrium
is achieved. But if the patient agent believes actual V will be a bit larger than Vˆ, and
she believes that all other patient agents have the same beliefs, then she will demand
early withdrawal since the return of waiting is already smaller than r1. And the more
a patient depositor believes that V will be large, the stronger her incentive will be to
demand early withdrawal. Other patient depositors will do the same, which reinforces
the belief. This strategic complementarity in demanding early withdrawal will lead V to
reach its maximum value, 1, and the bad equilibrium is achieved.
Note that when the return is revealed to be RL, no one is willing to wait until t = 2,
and the optimal choice is to liquidate the long-run investment, and each agent has the
probability of 1/r1 to get the short-run payment r1.
The banks will set r1 through the following optimization problem
max (1  q)(1  s)[lu(r1) + (1  l)u(r2)] + [(1  q)s+ q] 1r1u(r1) (B.3.6)





Table B.1: Consumption Patterns
Models First-order condition Resource constraint
Autarky cm = 1 cp =
(
RH with prob. of (1  q)
1 with prob. of q








Deposit contract with insurance u0(r1 ) = RHu
0(r2 ) r2 =




Autarky W 0autarky = (1  q)[lu(1) + (1  l)u(RH)] + qu(1)
Optimal risk sharing W 0optimal = (1  q)[lu(cm) + (1  l)u(cp2)] + qu(1)
Deposit contract without insurance WTSNI = (1  q)(1  s)[lu(r1) + (1  l)u(r2)] + [(1  q)s+ q] 1r1 u(r

1)













Now in this section, the banks will set up a deposit insurance fund and each puts in a. The
sequential service constraint still applies, and the deposit insurance works the following
way:
(1) If V  1 ar1 , i.e., the banks can fulfill all withdrawal demand by liquidating assets,
the deposit insurance fund will not intervene;
(2) If V > 1 ar1 , i.e., some early withdrawal demand can not be satisfied even when
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banks already liquidate all assets, then the deposit insurance fund will ensure that those
depositors with fi  1r1 get r1, the deposit contract return in period T = 1, and that the
rest of the depositors get no more than d, the insurance coverage limit. Note that if d  r1,
then this limit works the same as a guarantee. If d > r1, then it implies full insurance, and
the actual insurance payout will be r1.




1 V if V <
1 a
r1
0 if V  1 ar1
Again, r2 decreases in V, and will reach its largest value, r2DI =
(1 a lr1)R
1 l when V





, which is smaller than 1r1 and also smaller than Vˆ.
Obviously, VˆDI is not an equilibrium point: if the patient agent believes actual V will
be a bit smaller than VˆDI , and she believes that all other patient agents have the same
beliefs, then she will not demand early withdrawal since waiting until the last period
generates a higher return. Other patient depositors will do the same, and V will equal
l, the good equilibrium is achieved. But if the patient agent believes actual V will be a
bit larger than VˆDI , and she believes that all other patient agents have the same beliefs,
then she will demand early withdrawal since the return of waiting is already smaller
than r1. And the more a patient depositor believes that V will be large, the stronger
her incentive will be to demand early withdrawal, i.e., strategic complementarity. Other
patient depositors will do the same, which reinforces the belief.
When V increases to the value of 1 ar1 , the deposit insurance will be triggered. Patient
depositors still get zero if they choose to wait, but if they demand early withdrawal, there
is a chance of 1r1 of getting r1, and otherwise get d, compared to the no insurance case
where they get r1 with probability of 1r1 , and otherwise get nothing.
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From the above analysis, we see that with the deposit insurance, the threshold value
of V which equate r1 and r2 becomes smaller, implying a potential higher probability of
panic bank runs since the range of “run" beliefs is larger. The advantage of the insurance,
however, is that it increases the welfare when bank run occurs.
The following section gives the mathematical representation of these two counteract-
ing effects, therefore allowing us to analyze the welfare impact of deposit insurance and
to find out the optimal level of the insurance coverage limit.
When bank run happens, the bank liquidates all it assets (1   a when there is no
liquidation cost), and the deposit insurance fundwill pay the gap between the liquidation
value and the promised value, which is 1r1 r1 + (1  1r1 )d  (1  a) = (1  1r1 )d+ a.
The actuarially fair premium 9 is:
a  a[(1  1
r1






We argue that there will be no sunspot bank runs, and will check this proposition
afterwards.
With the deposit insurance, the optimization problem of the bank is













9Note that this calculation method works only if there are only idiosyncratic bank runs, which are not
realistic. We’ll explore other premium calculation methods later, for instance, the worst-scenario premium,
which means the premium collected must be no less than the liquidity needed in times of crisis. This
method also assumes away credit line or bailout of the fund by central banks or treasuries. We consider the
actuarially fair case first for simplicity.
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Taking first-order derivatives, we’ll get the following two conditions:
u0(r1)  RHu0(r2) = q1  q
1
lr21
[u(r1)  r1u0(r1)  u(d) + dRHu0(r2)] (B.3.13)
u0(d) = RHu0(r2) (B.3.14)
Therefore, we have u0(r1)  u0(d) = q1 q 1lr21 [u(r1)  r1u
0(r1)  u(d) + du0(d)]. Since
u(x)   xu0(x) is increasing in x for the concave function u, the RHS is positive when
r1 > d. But the LHS will become negative since u0(x) is decreasing in x. The equation will
hold only when d = r1, which implies full insurance10.
The optimal contract is given by




RH[ 11 q   (l+ q1 q )r1 ]
1  l (B.3.18)
10Interestingly, if we change the implementation of the sequential service constraint and the design of the
deposit insurance a little bit, we’ll still get the same conclusion that the optimal level of insurance coverage
limit is equal to the interest rate in period T = 1 promised in the demand deposit contract, i.e., d = r1.
The change is this: instead of serving depositors one by one in the line immediately, each depositor will
get a number indicating her position in the line. Then, after all depositors who want to withdraw money
in period T = 1 show up, the bank will count the number of depositors demanding early withdrawal. If
that number is smaller than 1 ar1 , then deposit insurance will not be triggered, and the banks will liquidate
their assets in order to meet the liquidity demand. Otherwise, the deposit insurance fund will intervene,
and pay all depositors the same amount minfdelta, r1g .
In this case, the insurance payout and therefore the premium charged on banks are totally different. The
actuarially fair premium will be a = a[d  (1  a)] = a1 a (d  1).
Then the banks’ optimization problem becomes




1  l and a =
q
1  q (d  1) (B.3.16)
Taking first-order derivatives, we’ll get the following two conditions u0(r1) = RHu0(r2) and u0(d) =
RHu0(r2), which gives us d = r1, i.e., full insurance, the same conclusion we drawn from the “withdraw as
you go" case. And the values of r1, r2, a and d will also be the same.
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Going back to check whether the deposit insurance can indeed eliminate sunspot
bank runs. Under deposit insurance, when the state is revealed to be RH, if the patient
agent decides to demand early withdrawal, she will get u(r1 ) no matter whether there
are bank runs or not, and if she decides to wait, she will get u(r2 ). Equation (B.3.17)
implies r2 is larger than r1 , therefore in the solvent state, not running on banks is the
dominant strategy for patient depositors under deposit insurance. We have proved that
sunspot runs will be eliminated and therefore the optimization problem is correct.
And of course we need to check whether the welfare under deposit insurance is
higher than autarky to make sure that banks with deposit insurance are desirable in the
very beginning.
Compared to the benchmark case, here the demand deposit contract accompanied
with deposit insurance does not achieve optimal risk sharing. This is because the positive
probability of bank runs incurs a premium charged on the banks, which reduces their
profits and therefore the interest rate paid to depositors at period 1. This results in a more
than optimal probability of bank runs, and therefore the welfare is reduced.
We assume that the utility function takes the following CARA form 11
u(c) = 1  e gc (B.3.19)
Plug the utility function into first-order equations and solve for the values, and we’ll
get numerical solutions for the optimizing problems in sections above. These values are
computed in MATLAB, and the codes are listed in Appendix B.
The parameters take the following values in the numerical example:
The equilibrium values of variables are summarized in the table below.
When there is uncertainty about the true states of the world, the fact that bank run
is bound to occur in the low state forces the banks to lower their non-contingent short-
11Note that we require u(0) = 0 in our model. That’s why the common form of utility function u(c) =
c1 g/(1  g) doesn’t apply here.
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Table B.3: Parameter Values
Two-State Model
Parameters Value
q 0.05 probability of low state
s 0.05 probability of sunspot
l 0.5 proportion of impatient agents
g 2 risk aversion
RH 3 return to investment in high state
N 500 number of grids
Table B.4: Demand Deposit Contract
Two-State Model
Autarky Optimal risk sharing Demand Deposit Contract
Without Insurance With Insurance
r1 1 1.363 1.248 1.336
r2 3 1.912 2.255 1.885
Wel f are 0.928 0.952 0.932 0.953
run payment to the depositors, so that when bank run does occur, the welfare loss due
to nothing to get for some agents can be reduced. This introduces a new type of risk
sharing, namely risk sharing across states, into the classical Diamond-Dybvig model,
which only has risk sharing among agents. Here, optimal contract is determined by a
trade-off between risk-sharing across agents during the good state and reducing welfare
loss during the bad state; in other words, the risk-sharing across late and early consumers
is reduced to make room for risk-sharing across good and bad economic states in order
to achieve the optimal allocation.
When the low state is realized, the chance is higher for each agent to get the short-run
payment. This implies a risk sharing between different states of the world, in addition to
the risk sharing between different types of agents. However, the across-state risk sharing
comes at a cost. When high state is realized, there is less risk sharing between patient and
impatient agents since r1 < r1H.
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Also note that the expected welfare generating from the bank’s deposit contract is
higher than that of autarky as long as the probabilities s and q are small enough. The ad-
vantages brought by the risk-sharing function of the demand deposit contract outweighs
the disadvantage resulting from bank runs.
B.3.4 Continuous-State Extension
Motivation: in the two-state model, the probability of insolvent state is an exogenous
number, independent of demand-deposit contract interest rate. In the following section,
we’ll study the case where there is a continuum of states and where the probability of
insolvent state and the magnitude of deposit interest rate are jointly determined.
There is a continuum of potential states and each corresponds to a risky return of Ri.
We assume that the expected value of long-run payment, E(r2) = E(R)(1  lr1)/(1  l)
is greater than the short-run payment, therefore banks are still desirable ex ante.
The true state of the world will be revealed at t = 1, and each agent will act according
to his or her type and the true state. Early consumers will always withdraw at t = 1, and
late consumers will do so as well if R is too low.
For the sections below, we assume R follows uniform distribution 12.
In Autarky state, if R is revealed to be smaller than one, both types of agents will
liquidate their investment. If R is larger than one, only impatient agents will liquidate
investment, and patient agents will wait until period 2 and consume R units of goods.
The threshold return Rˆ is equal to one. The probability that both types of agents will
demand early liquidation is
pˆ = Prob(R  1) = 1  R
R¯  R (B.3.20)
which is a constant.
12We will also explore the case where the distribution of investment return is a function of banker’s
managing efforts to study the effect of moral hazard when deposit insurance is put in place.
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The social welfare is







The optimal risk sharing question is












for every Ri 2 [R, R¯].












Wˆoptimal = (1  pˆ)[lu(cm) + (1  l)Eu(cp)] + pˆu(1) (B.3.28)
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With the demand deposit contract, the threshold return Rˆ, makes the late consumer
indifferent between withdrawing money at t = 1 and at t = 2, which implies
1
r1
u(r1) = u(rˆ2) = u(
Rˆ(1  lr1)
1  l ) (B.3.29)
therefore
Rˆ = Rˆ(r1) =
(1  l)u 1( 1r1u(r1))
1  lr1 (B.3.30)
When R > Rˆ, the economic fundamentals are good enough, and there will only
be panic-based bank runs; namely sun-spot equilibrium. In DD model, they assume an
exogenous probability of this kind of bank runs. We can assume the good equilibrium
happens all the time first for simplicity.
When R  Rˆ, economic fundamentals are so bad that both late and early consumers
will run on the banks. In other words, there is bound to be fundamental-driven bank
runs.
When there is no bank run, only early consumers demand withdrawal at t = 1 and
each get r1. Late consumers will wait until t = 2 and get whatever is left when the return
of the risky project is realized, r2 =
1 lr1
1 l R.
When there is a bank run and no deposit insurance, due to the sequential service
constraint, each agent has the probability of 1/r1 to get the short-run payment r1, and get
zero otherwise.
Same as the two-state model, we assume R follows a uniform distribution over [R, R¯].
Therefore, the probability with which R < Rˆ is






The optimizing problem is














for Ri greater than Rˆ.




























There is a deposit insurance which charges a premium of a at t = 0 and ensures each
depositor to get d when there is a bank run.
Same as in the two-statemodel, we suppose the premium is charged on the bank side.
There is a new threshold return R˜, which makes the late consumer indifferent between
withdrawing money at t = 1 and at t = 2 with deposit insurance,
u(d) = u(r˜2) = u(
R˜(1  lr1)
1  l ) (B.3.36)
which implies





R˜ = R˜(d, r1) =
(1  l)d
1  lr1 (B.3.38)
The optimization problem under deposit insurance is














1  p˜ (d  1) (B.3.42)














[lu(r1) + (1  l)E[R˜,R¯]u(r2i)  u(d)]
(B.3.43)
and














[lu(r1) + (1  l)E[R˜,R¯]u(r2i)  u(d)]
(B.3.44)
Plug the utility function into first-order equations and solve for the values, and we’ll
get numerical solutions for the optimizing problems in sections above.
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Table B.5: Parameter Values
Continuous-State Model
Parameters Value
s 0.05 probability of sunspot
l 0.5 proportion of impatient agents
g 2 risk aversion
R¯ 6 maximum return to investment
R 0 minimum return to investment
Table B.6: Demand Deposit Contract
Continuous-State Model
Autarky Optimal risk sharing Demand Deposit Contract
Without Insurance With Insurance
r1 1 1.215 1.109 0.219
E(r2) 3.5 2.747 3.08 5.975
Wel f are 0.915 0.93 0.909 0.704
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Appendix C
Appendix of Chapter 3
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C.1 First-best allocation
A benevolent social planner with perfect information will maximize the expected welfare:
max E[lU(cm1) + (1  l)bU(cp1 + cp2)]
subject to the resource constraint
(1  l)cp2 = [1 





1 l Yi to the utility function
Safe projects:


































If crm1 = c
s




p2 since yr < ys and
qYr < Ys.
If crp2 = c
s










ys , namely if ys >
yr
qYrYs.
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